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EXCUSES IN EXILE
Anders Kaye*
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that I have intentionally killed another person and that
I have done so without any justification. At first glance, it appears
that I am guilty of murder, a very serious crime. Since I am guilty of
this very serious crime, the state may inflict a very serious punishment on me—at least many years in prison, if not my whole life or
the death penalty.
But suppose that one of the following is also true in my case:
(A) At the time that I killed my victim, I suffered from a
mental disease and, as a result, lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of my conduct.
(B) Throughout my childhood and into my adolescent years,
my father physically and sexually abused me, leaving me
significantly more prone to violence than I would otherwise have been.
Both A and B are ethically and interpersonally important facts.
Both are likely to inspire some combination of sympathy, empathy,
and compassion. Both suggest that my story is not just the story of a
murderer and that there is a complicated explanation for my crime.
Nevertheless, A and B have very different implications for my
case. Because A shows that I am legally insane (in some jurisdictions) and insanity is an excuse, A blocks criminal conviction. B
shows that I have been exposed to criminogenic formative influences,1 and exposure to criminogenic formative influences is not
(in itself) excusing on traditional accounts of excuse, so B will not
bar my conviction. B may still play some role in my case: after I am
convicted, I may have the opportunity to tell the sentencer about B,
*
Anders Kaye, Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I am grateful to
Miriam Baer, James Binnall, Michael Cahill, Nina Chernoff, Erin Collins, John Dehn, Deven
Desai, Carissa Hessick, Linda Keller, Rebecca Lee, Christopher Slobogin, and all the
participants in a AALS 2013 Midyear Conference work-in-progress session for their very
helpful comments and suggestions.
1.
“Criminogenic formative influences” means experiences that influence the developing psychology, character, values, beliefs, attitudes, or desires of the person who experiences
them in such a way that that person becomes more likely to engage in criminal conduct. For
the sake of the example, this Article assumes that extended physical and sexual abuse during
childhood has this sort of influence.
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and the sentencer may determine that B is a mitigating fact and
reduce the punishment in my case.2 B will not, however, have any
bearing on my guilt or on the range of punishments the law authorizes my sentencer to impose.
In the universe of sympathetic and explanatory facts about
wrongdoers, then, some are excusing and others are only mitigating, and the law treats the former differently than the latter. But
how do we tell which facts are which? Why is insanity an excuse,
while criminogenic formative influences are only mitigation?
On a common view, the answer is straightforward. We excuse
those who cannot fairly be held responsible for what they have
done.3 So long as we have a theory of responsibility, then, we can
distinguish excusing facts from mitigating ones. Facts that make it
unfair to hold a person responsible for his wrong are excusing facts.
Facts that do not are, at most, mitigating.
Unfortunately, this seemingly straightforward answer glosses over
a hard problem in the relationship between excuse and mitigation.
Excuses and mitigations trigger many of the same reactions in us:
sympathy, empathy, and compassion. They help us understand why
a wrongdoer did what she did. They induce us to stand imaginatively in her shoes and to identify more deeply with a wrongdoer
who we might otherwise see as alien and inexplicable.4 Not surprisingly, then, some things regularly classified as mitigations can look
and feel a lot like excuses. (One persistently debated example is
“Rotten Social Background”5). Some switch from excuse to mitigation depending on who is picking. For example, some legal systems
treat provocation as a partial excuse, others as mitigation.6 Likewise,
2.
For example, the American Law Institute’s 2006 draft Model Penal Code indicates
that “the personal characteristics of offenders” may be mitigating “when indicative of circumstances of hardship, deprivation[,] [or] vulnerability.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.06(4)(a)
(Proposed Official Draft 2006). See Allan Manson, The Search for Principles of Mitigation: Integrating Cultural Demands, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 40, 47–48 (Julian
Roberts ed., 2011).
3.
See, e.g., J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2–3
(1956–57) (“[W]e admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility.”); 1
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 91 (1984); GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 798 (1978); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 548 (1997).
4.
Some theorists hold that excuse and identification are opposed, rather than linked,
but see, Anders Kaye, Objectifying and Identifying in the Theory of Excuse, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175
(2012), for an argument supporting a deep connection between excuse and identification.
5.
Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985).
6.
The provocation defense reduces murder to manslaughter when the killer acted in
the heat of passion due to adequate provocation. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 524 (5th ed. 2012). While scholars persistently debate the nature of the provocation defense, the most common view is that the defense is a partial excuse as passions
triggered in certain ways can diminish—but not entirely defeat—the actor’s responsibility.
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duress is normally an excuse, but may be treated as mitigation in
some trials under international criminal law.7 Still other mitigating
facts seem to live on the same continuum as an excuse, making categorical characterizations seem artificial. Examples include youth
not qualifying as legal infancy, mental illness not rising to the level
of legal insanity, and passion-inducing provocations not adequate
for the partial excuse of provocation.8
So what, then, is the relationship between excuse and mitigation?
Are mitigations weak, partial, incomplete, or near-miss excuses? Are
they facts that elicit compassionate or empathetic9 reactions for reasons having nothing to do with excusing?10 Are they something else
entirely? To date, mitigation has not been well theorized,11 and, as a
Arie Freiberg & Felicity Stewart, Beyond the Partial Excuse: Australasian Approaches to Provocation
as a Sentencing Factor, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 102, 104 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011). Theorists often conceptualize provocation as a mitigating fact. For example,
many discussions that explicitly grant provocation the status of a defense nevertheless also
refer to it as mitigating. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra. Indeed, the conceptual ambiguity is so
difficult that while American jurisdictions and England treat provocation as a partial defense,
a number of other legal systems rooted in the same traditions have recently stripped provocation of its status as a defense and have decided to treat provocation as a mitigating factor only
at sentencing. Freiberg & Stewart, supra, at 103; Warren Young & Andrea King, Addressing
Problematic Sentencing Factors in the Development of Guidelines, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION
AT SENTENCING 208, 220–21 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011) (discussing New Zealand’s approach
to provocation, which treats provocation as a mitigating factor).
7.
See Olaoluwa Olusanya, Excuse and Mitigation Under International Criminal Law:
Redrawing Conceptual Boundaries, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 23, 52–58 (2010) (reviewing cases in
which courts struggled with whether duress was (even) mitigating where defendants participated in mass murders under pressure or threats from superiors).
8.
Regarding the potential mitigating significance of such facts, see William W. Berry
III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT
SENTENCING 247 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011) (“The youth of the offender in certain cases can
mitigate a retributive sentence based on a determination that a juvenile possesses a decreased
level of culpability”) (emphasis added); Stephen Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 296 (2003) (“Lesser rationality or control problems . . .
may be considered . . . as a matter of discretion at sentencing.”); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability
and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 147, 152,
n.21 (treating vulnerability to harm in prison due to mental illness not qualifying for insanity
defense as mitigating factor).
9.
Lovegrove notes that the general public may be more willing to mitigate sentences
for offenders when they “see offenders as fellow beings, rather than as, in effect, different
and less” and that society may be more inclined to see offenders in this way than popular
wisdom has recognized. Austin Lovegrove, The Pernicious Impact of Perceived Public Opinion on
Sentencing: Findings from an Empirical Study of the Public’s Approach to Personal Mitigation, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 188, 199 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011).
10. Manson, supra note 2, at 42 (arguing that the “legitimate sympathy” of the sentencer
may drive at least some mitigations).
11. This is a common lament in recent work on mitigation. See, e.g., id. at 40; ANDREW
ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 156 (5th ed. 2010); see also Young & King,
supra note 6, at 225. Indeed, as Jacobson and Hough point out, two recent and substantial
English legislative efforts to provide a framework for consideration of sentencing factors noticeably failed to offer systematic principles regarding mitigation. Jessica Jacobson & Mike
Hough, Personal Mitigation: An Empirical Analysis in England and Wales, in MITIGATION AND
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result, there is no easy or obvious account of its relationship to
excuses.12
This Article suggests that scrutinizing the relationship between
excuse and mitigation reveals that the distinctions are less sharp
than currently supposed. Indeed, the category “mitigation” sometimes plays an illegitimate role in accounts of responsibility and
excuse, serving as a catch-basin for facts that elicit excusing intuitions but do not fit harmoniously into those accounts of
responsibility and excuse. In this light, such mitigations appear as
the remainders of the unbalanced equations13 of responsibility theory, and the realm of mitigation becomes the unconscious of the
criminal law—the hidden and anarchical place to which we exile
unwanted but inescapable truths about criminality.
Part II of this Article begins with a basic taxonomy of the facts at
issue, giving examples of facts that traditional law and theory treat
as excusing and those they treat as mitigating. It shows why categorizing facts as excusing or mitigating matters in the legal setting,
laying out the very different ways the criminal law handles excuses
AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 146, 163 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011). Likewise, a recent effort in
New Zealand to specify aggravating and mitigating factors “[p]rovides no guidance as to why
a factor aggravates or mitigates.” Young & King, supra note 6, at 212. See also Olusanya, supra
note 7, at 52–58 (2010) (exploring the uncertain boundary between duress and coercion in
international criminal law).
Jacobson and Hough make the related observation that sentencers may not theorize
about mitigation either. The authors interviewed forty sentencers about the factors considered during sentencing. They were “surprised” to find that “many of [their] respondents
were hesitant or reluctant to generalize about the kinds of personal mitigation that influence
their sentences. Their answers indicated that they had not previously considered the concept
of mitigation in terms of theory or general principal.” Jacobson & Hough, supra, at 152.
12. Recent developments in the law of provocation highlight the urgent need for a theoretical account of the relationship between mitigation and excuse. While American and
English law treat provocation as a partial excuse (reducing murder to manslaughter in some
cases in which the offender acted in the heat of passion), a number of Australasian jurisdictions have recently abolished the provocation defense and have made provocation a matter
of mitigation. Freiberg & Stewart, supra note 6, at 104. If there is a clear boundary between
excuse and mitigation and if provocation is properly located on the excuse side of this
boundary, the Australasian shift is problematic. Of course, saying whether there is such a
boundary and where provocation sits in relation to that boundary, without a theory of the
relationship between mitigation and excuse, is difficult.
13. As The Architect says to Neo in THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner Brothers, 2003),
“Your life is the sum of a remainder of an unbalanced equation inherent to the programming of the matrix.” The Architect’s feeling about this leftover quantity captures perfectly
the attitude the criminal law seems to manifest in its handling of the leftover excuses shunted
into the mitigation catchbasin: “You are the eventuality of an anomaly, which despite my
sincerest efforts I have been unable to eliminate from what is otherwise a harmony of mathematical precision.” Just as Neo—the leftover piece in The Matrix—ultimately brings down
the otherwise perfect “harmony of mathematical precision,” so too the leftover excuses labeled mitigations have the potential to bring down seemingly harmonious accounts of
responsibility and excuse.
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and mitigations, and highlighting the comparably anarchical character of the domain of mitigation. With this foundation in place,
Part III develops a schema for distinguishing excusing facts from
mitigating facts. The crux of this schema is that facts diminishing a
person’s responsibility are excusing, while facts that favor reducing
punishment for other reasons are mitigating. Applying this schema
to various facts traditionally treated as either excusing or mitigating, Part IV resorts these facts into three categories:
uncontroversially excusing, uncontroversially mitigating, and the
“exiles”—a cohort of facts that might plausibly treated be treated as
excusing but have traditionally been relegated to the domain of
mitigation.
These potential exiles raise deep questions about the traditional
division between excusing and mitigating facts. Part V surveys several possible reasons for exiling these potential excuses. Though
this Part considers some pragmatic explanations, it highlights the
possibility that less practical and perhaps unsavory reasons motivate
exiling some excuses, including anxiety over their implications for
comfortable and cherished visions of the criminal law and society
more broadly. It is on this view that some mitigations appear as the
unbalanced remainders of responsibility theory, and that mitigation
emerges as the unconscious to which the criminal law has banished
them. Because banishing excuses for these sorts of reasons undercuts both the justice and the legitimacy of the criminal law, Part VI
suggests some therapies—some ways to bring the conflicts buried in
the criminal law’s unconscious closer to the surface so that we can
grapple with them more meaningfully.
Ultimately, this Article hopes to cast light on the boundary between excuse and mitigation, to suggest that current practice exiles
unwanted excuses to the realm of mitigation, and to show how this
practice marginalizes a wealth of rich and important information
about criminals and crime.

II. EXCUSES, MITIGATIONS, AND THE DIFFERENT WAYS
WE HANDLE THEM
Some facts are normally considered excusing while others are
normally considered mitigating. This Part lays out a basic descriptive taxonomy of excusing and mitigating facts and shows that, in
the criminal justice system, a great deal rides on the categorization.
Building on this foundation, subsequent Parts will explore whether
it makes sense to distinguish between excuses and mitigations the
way we do.
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A. A Conventional Taxonomy of Excusing and Mitigating Facts
Legal doctrine and practice categorize some facts as excusing
and others as potentially mitigating. The universe of excusing facts
is not hard to map: the excuses are usually codified or well-established in case-law, and set out straightforwardly in treatises, and law
school casebooks usually codify the list of excuses. Mitigations, in
contrast, are harder to catalog. Some criminal codes and sentencing guidelines provide partial lists of potential mitigations, but
these lists do not line up especially well with the universe of facts
that attorneys, juries, and judges treat as mitigating in criminal
practice. Indeed, because the law generally does not formulate mitigations in concrete ways and because mitigations are often invoked
in quasi-formal proceedings that do not produce clear records or
reports of the claims and arguments made or credited, creating a
comprehensive catalog of the mitigations that attorneys advance
and that juries and courts credit in the sentencing process may not
be possible. Still, it is possible to get at least a sense of the the universe of potentially mitigating facts from codes and guidelines,
discussion in the case-law, empirical research regarding sentencing
process, and the accounts of practitioners and judges.
Facts normally considered excusing in the criminal law include
the offender’s infancy,14 subnormal intelligence,15 legal insanity,16
intoxication,17 diminished capacity,18 duress,19 entrapment,20 and
even provocation.21 A handful of other facts are sometimes treated
as excusing, but the list of excusing facts is not very long.
The universe of potentially mitigating facts is much larger and
quite diverse. Under contemporary convention some are “offenserelated,” others are “offender-related,” and still others are tied to
the administration of criminal justice.
14.
15.

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.6 (5th ed. 2010).
See, e.g., 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 174 (1984).

16. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 14, at Chapter 7.
17. See, e.g., id. at § 9.5(h) (involuntary intoxication).
18. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 6, at § 26.03.
19. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 9.7 (explaining that the duress defense excuses a
person who does something normally a crime if a threat of imminent deadly harm coerced
her to commit the crime).
20. See, e.g., 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 209 (1984) (explaining that
entrapment defense excuses an offender the police induced to engage in uncharacteristic
criminal conduct).
21. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 6, at § 31.07[C][2][b] (“[M]ost modern courts” view
provocation as a partial excuse).
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Offense-related mitigating facts are facts about the offense itself.
Often, they are facts about how the offender committed the offense: the offender played a minor role,22 limited the damage,23 or
had an unusually sympathetic motive.24 Sometimes, they are about
the circumstances under which the offense was committed:25 the
offender was under non-excusing duress, provoked by a legally inadequate provocation, non-excusingly intoxicated, responding to
the victim’s wrongful conduct,26 or experiencing a stressful personal crisis or emergency.
Offender-related mitigations are facts about the offender that go
beyond the facts of the offense. Some are positive facts about the
wrongdoer’s personal history:27 having no prior criminal record or
unusual, past good deeds; a personal history showing the offense
22. See Julian V. Roberts & Mike Hough, Exploring Public Attitudes to Sentencing Factors in
England and Wales, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 168, 177 (Julian Roberts
ed., 2011) (finding that the general public considers it mitigating that the offender “played a
minor role in [the] crime”). See also Young & King, supra note 6, at 211 (discussing New
Zealand’s Sentencing Act treatment of offender’s “limited involvement” as mitigating factor).
23. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149 (showing that sentencers treat a “low level
of impact,” “no violence/low level of violence,” or “poorly executed/unsophisticated” as mitigating); Julian V. Roberts, Punishing, More or Less: Exploring Aggravation and Mitigation at
Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 1 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011); Manson, supra note 2, at 43–44.
24. For example, the offender may have killed a loved one in order to spare them continued suffering during the last stage of a terminal illness or battered a perceived criminal
while participating in a neighborhood watch. See Stephan Terblanche, The Discretionary Effect
of Mitigating and Aggravating Factors: A South African Case Study, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 261, 273 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011) (describing a case in which
preventing crime in the community was a mitigating factor); Manson, supra note 2, at 44.
These good-motive mitigations raise the possibility that some mitigations are partial justifications (insofar as good motives may be significant because they reduce the wrongfulness of the
offender’s conduct). While this Article explores the relationship between mitigation and excuse, exploring the relationship between mitigation and justification may also reveal a similar
dynamic.
25. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149; Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at 177
(finding that the general public in England and Wales places the greatest mitigating weight
on the fact that the “crime was committed in an emergency.”); id. at 181 (finding that the
“victim provoked the offender” was mitigating). See Berry, supra note 8, at 250; Kate Warner,
Equality Before the Law: Racial and Social Background Factors as Sources of Mitigation at Sentencing,
in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 124, 139 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011) (treating
“emotional stress” at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor); Lovegrove, supra note 9,
at 199 (suggesting that people would “make allowance[s]” in sentencing for “challenging
personal circumstances”).
26. See Young & King, supra note 6, at 211.
27. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 11–12 (discussing “positive actions by the offender
which speak to his or her good character but which are unrelated to the offense” and
“performan[ce of] some commendable action for the community” or an “act of exceptional
bravery”); Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at 175–76; Manson, supra note 2, at 45; Jacobson
& Hough, supra note 11, at 149; Young & King, supra note 6, at 211; Andrew Ashworth, ReEvaluating the Justifications for Aggravation and Mitigation at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 21, 27, 28 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011); Berry, supra note 8, at 250.
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was aberrant behavior; a record of military service; sacrifice for the
community; religious devotion; or being a devoted and loving parent.28 Sometimes, they are facts showing the wrongdoer had been
exposed to criminogenic formative influences prior to the offense:29 being raised in grinding poverty, subjected to brutal
oppression, physically or sexually abused by a relative,30 or corrupted by bad role models, peer pressure, group indoctrination, or
hate propaganda and rhetoric.31 Sometimes, they show the offender was handicapped or impaired in a way not rising to the level
of an excuse:32 she was non-excusingly young,33 intellectually impaired or mentally ill,34 or she was impaired by age-related
disability. Along a different line, some offender-related mitigating
facts go to the offender’s likely future, suggesting that she is less
dangerous than others who commit similar offenses35 or more likely

28. Some have opposed treating this sort of good-record evidence as mitigating. See, e.g.,
Olusanya, supra note 7, at 47 (arguing that international criminal courts have treated serious
offenders leniently because of good-record evidence at the expense “of justice for victims”);
Ashworth, supra note 27, at 28–29; see also Roberts, supra note 23, at 12. Along the same lines,
the United States Sentencing Guidelines suggest that “prior good works” are not typically
considered as mitigation. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.11 (2005).
29. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 368 (1996) (“[D]uring the sentencing process, the law has traditionally
permitted the story of the defendant’s character-formation to come before the judge or jury
in all its narrative complexity.”); Warner, supra note 25, at 125, 127, 128–29, 133–34, 135–36;
Berry, supra note 8, at 247; Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149, 156–57.
Jacobson and Hough go on to note that “sentencers appear to be somewhat deaf to claims
of disadvantage,” perhaps because “the vast majority of defendants are disadvantaged in some
way or another . . . which effectively rules out special treatment on these grounds.” Id. at 157.
Other research suggests that even if judges place less weight on common social disadvantage,
popular intuitions may consider social disadvantage a significant mitigator. See, e.g.,
Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 202.
30. See, e.g., GARY WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme, in AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY 219, 235–42 (2004); Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at
176–77. But see Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 154–55 (finding sentencers not greatly
weighting offender’s history of childhood abuse, perhaps, because they found it so common
among offenders as to make it “unremarkable”).
31. Recent debate in the context of international criminal law and prosecutions for hate
crimes has discussed the mitigating significance of corruption due to hate propaganda and
rhetoric. See Olusanya, supra note 7, at 35–38.
32. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 148–49; Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 200–01
(finding that subjects were inclined to mitigate sentence for a wide array of more and less
concrete impairments, including “low intellectual capacity,” lack of “life skills,” and “low selfesteem”); Young & King, supra note 6, at 211.
33. Berry, supra note 8, at 250; Young & King, supra note 6, at 211.
34. Johnston, supra note 8, at 158–59, n. 49–51.
35. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 10, at 149 (Julian Roberts ed. 2011) (suggesting that
sentencers treat as mitigating the offender’s “physical illness or old age”).
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to do good: due to unusual personality traits, values, skills, or education, she is unusually susceptible to rehabilitation36 or unusually
likely to make positive contributions to her community.37 Sometimes, they are redeeming facts about the offender’s reactions to
her own offense: feeling remorse,38 repairing damage done,39 or becoming a better or less dangerous person. Sometimes, they show
that normal punishments will have abnormal impact on the offender:40 due to physical illness, mental illness, age, cultural
background,41 vulnerability to physical or sexual assault,42 or other
personal characteristics, she will lose or suffer more than most offenders would.43 Other offender-related mitigating facts suggest the
offender has already suffered as a result of her offense44 or has suffered more than others in the past (e.g., from bereavement,
36. See Ashworth, supra note 26, at 25 (noting significance of willingness to undergo
drug addiction treatment); Jacobson & Hough, supra note 10, at 149; Berry, supra note 8, at
256; Joanna Shapland, Personal Mitigation and Assumptions About Offending and Desistance, in
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, 60, 76 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011).
One perhaps unexpected consequence of mitigating intuitions here is that an offender’s
“advantaged” background can become a mitigating factor. Offenders from more privileged
backgrounds are more likely to appear good candidates for reintegration, as they are more
likely to have strong educational backgrounds, strong vocational skills, a record of good
deeds, and strong family support. They are also more likely to avail themselves of opportunities for treatment of drug, alcohol, and psychiatric problems. Thus, sentencers may think
they are less likely to be dangerous in the future than other offenders. Their advantaged
background becomes a mitigating factor. See Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 157–58.
37. See Manson, supra note 2, at 56; Roberts, supra note 23, at 15; Ashworth, supra note
27, at 30; Berry, supra note 8, at 256; Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149.
38. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 10, at 149; Roberts & Hough, supra note 21 at 176–77;
Roberts, supra note 22, at 15–16; Ashworth, supra note 27, at 34; Young & King, supra note 6,
at 211.
39. Ashworth, supra note 27, at 25.
40. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 8, at 181–82.
41. Warner, supra note 25, at 131, 137–38.
42. See id. at 138.
43. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 6; Ashworth, supra note 27, at 25–26; Manson,
supra note 2, at 57.
Regarding old age in particular, see Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149; Warner,
supra note 25, at 138; Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at 176–77. Regarding illness, see
Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149; Warner, supra note 25, at 138. At least some jurisdictions treat as mitigating an offender’s mental illness (where it does not qualify for the
insanity defense) because this vulnerability may cause the offender excessive hardship.
Among other things, such offenders may be at higher risk of physical or sexual assault, may
be more likely to incur prison sanctions, and may be more vulnerable to psychological deterioration. Johnston, supra note 8, at 150–52, n.21. Johnston also notes that courts have reduced
sentences where offenders appeared to be at heightened risk of physical or sexual assault due
to youth, size, perceived sexuality, sexual offender status, and for other similar reasons. Id. at
181, n.169.
44. See Shapland, supra 36, at 65; Roberts, supra note 23, at 12; Ashworth, supra note 27,
at 31; Manson, supra note 2, at 55; Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 149.
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depression, or disease).45 Still other mitigating factors look beyond
the offender to third parties the punishment will impact, as where
punishing the offender in the normal way will have abnormally
harmful impact on the wrongdoer’s family or community.46
Concerns for judicial economy, effective prosecution, and other
systemic considerations animate additional mitigating facts.47 Thus,
judicial economy may favor treating an offender’s guilty plea as mitigating. Likewise, assistance to the prosecution of others may be
mitigating because it facilitates effective prosecution.48
As this taxonomy suggests, the universe of potentially mitigating
facts is enormously diverse. Not surprisingly, there is no consensus
about either its membership or its boundaries.
This taxonomy also highlights the uncertain relationship between excuse and mitigation. While the list of excuses is short and
exclusive and the list of mitigations is long and amorphous, the
boundary between the two categories is obscure. This is apparent
from the many facts that can be either mitigating or excusing depending on their magnitude: for example, youth, intellectual
impairment, mental disturbance, intoxication, provocation, and duress are each excusing in some cases but only mitigating in others.
Because these sorts of impairments and difficult circumstances exist
on continua, it is not obvious that there is a non-controversial
boundary between instances that are excusing and those that are
merely mitigating.
Likewise, showing non-controversial, principled distinctions between the circumstantial excuses and the circumstantial mitigations
can be difficult. For example, some circumstances that pressure
people to commit offenses are considered duress (and therefore
excusing) while others that do the same thing are considered hardship or deprivation (and therefore merely mitigating). Some
circumstances that seem to induce wrongdoing are excusing, like
entrapment, or partially excusing, like provocation, while others
are at most mitigating, like hardship and deprivation. While legal
45. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 155, 157; Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at
177.
46. Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 201; Manson, supra note 2, at 57; Ashworth, supra note
27, at 29, 32.
47. Roberts, supra note 23, at 8 (“[This serves] the wider objective of constraining the
costs of justice, enhancing the crime control function of the criminal justice system and sparing victims and witnesses from having to testify.”). See also Ashworth, supra note 27, at 33.
48. Roberts, supra note 23, at 8. See also Ashworth, supra note 27, at 33 (noting that the
practice of mitigating sentence in return for a guilty plea or cooperation with authorities
reflects the “state’s interest in economy and efficiency” in the administration of criminal
justice); Young & King, supra note 6, at 211.
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doctrine uses well-known criteria to distinguish excusing circumstances from the merely mitigating, it is not obvious that those
factual criteria adequately explain or justify the categorizations.
The blurriness of the boundary between excusing facts and mitigating facts may flow from important characteristics they have in
common. For the most part, both excusing and mitigating facts are
about the wrongdoer’s character, constitution, or personal history,
or about the circumstances in which she acted.49 Excusing facts and
mitigating facts both tend to elicit sympathy, empathy, and compassion from others. Both normally help us understand more about
why the alleged wrongdoer did what she did. As a result, both excusing facts and mitigating facts normally induce identification with
the wrongdoer. Because understanding, sympathy, empathy, and
identification are central to excuse,50 the difficulty in segregating
such facts into distinct camps is not surprising.

B. Differences In Treatment
Excuses and mitigations have a lot in common and may be very
closely related. Given this close kinship, does the categorization of
particular facts matter?
In the context of the criminal law, categorization matters a great
deal since it will have very significant substantive and procedural
consequences. The categorization determines whether the wrongdoer is spared from conviction for his wrongdoing. It will also have
other important consequences, for there are important differences
in the way the law conceptualizes excuses and mitigations, in the
extent to which the law mandates that excuses and mitigations have
particular ramifications for wrongdoers, and in the procedural safeguards that apply to the litigation of excuses and mitigations. On
each of these fronts, criminal law takes excuses much more seriously than mitigations.

49. Although mitigations serving the administration of criminal justice do not seem
closely related to excuses, they may be related to some of the non-exculpatory defenses, such
as statutes of limitations or diplomatic immunity.
50. See Anders Kaye, Objectifying and Identifying in the Theory of Excuse, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L.
175 (2012) (arguing that excuse theory has failed to appreciate the central role that identification plays in the excuses).
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1. Impact on the Legal Consequences of the Wrongdoing
The most obvious way the criminal law privileges excuses over
mitigations is in their very different consequences for the defendant. Normally, excuses relieve offenders from conviction and
punishment while mitigations do not.
An excuse blocks conviction and punishment for the crime for
which the wrongdoer would normally have been convicted. A person who kills intentionally is normally guilty of murder, but if she is
excused due to insanity, then she is not guilty after all. The consequence of the excuse is that the defendant cannot be convicted of
or punished for her wrong. Of course, some excuses are only partial. If the killer killed in a heat of passion and had an adequate
provocation for that passion, she is excused with respect to murder
but not voluntary manslaughter. Even here, however, the excuse
blocks conviction for a crime for which the defendant would normally have been convicted.
In contrast, mitigations do not block the normal consequences of
wrongdoing. If the defendant committed an armed robbery, and
there are facts the jury and judge consider mitigating in his case—
e.g., he is seriously but non-excusingly mentally ill, he is a decorated war hero, or he was brutally abused as a child—such
mitigating facts do not preclude his conviction or punishment.51
These facts may play a role during sentencing, where, if the sentencer is sufficiently impressed, she may reduce the sentence within
the range legally authorized for the defendant’s crime. They do not
alter the range of punishments the sentencer may legally impose
for the crime. Thus, mitigating facts may reduce punishment but
do not block conviction or alter the range of punishments
available.52
51. Such facts might induce the fact-finder to nullify the conviction, but the law does not
dictate (or even approve) such nullification.
52. In some cases, these two kinds of consequences may appear to collapse together—
functionally, if not formally. For example, one way to characterize the consequence of a
partial excuse is to say that it reduces the punishment the defendant faces. If the defendant
kills intentionally but does so in an adequately provoked heat of passion, she has the partial
excuse of provocation. The formal consequence of this partial excuse is that she cannot be
convicted of murder but still can be convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The functional
result is that she will still be punished, but the legally authorized punishment range is reduced. It may appear that partial excuses are functionally similar to mitigations, insofar as
neither precludes conviction per se and each reduces a defendant’s punishment. Indeed,
commentators sometimes seem to equate them with mitigations. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra
note 6, at § 31.07[A]. The differences between consequences for partial excuses and mitigations are significant. Partial excuses prevent the wrongdoer from being convicted of a crime
for which she would have otherwise been convictable, while mitigations do not. In this way,
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In short, excuses block conviction for all or some crimes, exempting wrongdoers from the usual consequences of their wrongdoings,
while mitigations do not. Here, then, the criminal justice system
takes excuses more seriously than mitigations.
2. Formal Conceptualization in the Law
The criminal justice system privileges excuses over mitigations in
several other important ways. One involves conceptualization: the
criminal law formally conceptualizes the excuses, but does not similarly conceptualize the mitigations.53
The law formally conceptualizes excuses in the sense that it labels
each excuse and defines each excuse with specific and concrete elements. For example, in the New York Penal Code, Article Thirty
sets out the infancy excuse,54 and Article Forty sets out excuses of
duress, entrapment, and mental disease or defect. 55 These provisions serve as both a catalog of recognized excuses and a list of
specific and concrete elements for each. Mental disease or defect,
for example, requires a “mental disease or defect” and a substantial
impairment of the “capacity to appreciate or know” the “nature and
consequences of such conduct” or “that such conduct was wrong.”56
In contrast, mitigations are generally not formally conceptualized. In most jurisdictions, no list sets out what should count as
mitigating and no authoritative source establishes the definitions or
schema for the mitigations. Parental abuse may be mitigating, for
example, but no authority establishes this or sets out the facts or
partial excuses reduce both the maximum and the minimum legally authorized punishments; mitigations do not. Thus, partial excuses restructure the consequences of the
wrongdoer’s action in ways wholly different from mitigations.
53. As discussed below, formal conceptualization is important. Litigants are more likely
to seek, recognize, investigate, and advance potential claims that the law formally conceptualizes. Formal conceptualization should result in more careful, rigorous, and accurate
assessment of claims.
54. N. Y. PENAL CODE § 30.
55. N. Y. PENAL CODE § 40.
56. N.Y. PENAL CODE §§ 40, 40.05, 40.15. Regarding the mental disease or defect excuse,
for example, Article 40.15 provides:
§ 40.15 Mental disease or defect.
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when the defendant
engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of
mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to
know or appreciate either:
1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
2. That such conduct was wrong.
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circumstances that the defendant must prove to establish this potentially mitigating fact. While she must show some sort of abuse,
no authority specifies what counts as abuse, how much abuse there
must be, or what sort of evidence suffices to prove the abuse.57
Jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guidelines do sometimes formally recognize some mitigations.58 Their sentencing
guidelines may identify certain facts or factors as potentially mitigating and may provide detailed or elemental definitions. Such
jurisdictions, however, normally do not attempt to comprehensively
catalog mitigating factors. Instead, they typically identify and define
a small number of mitigating facts. For the rest of the universe of
potentially mitigating facts, such jurisdictions rely on default or
catchall provisions authorizing consideration of “other” mitigating
factors, without labels or definitions.59 As a result, the catalog of
formally recognized mitigations typically does not reach many of
the mitigating factors actually asserted and argued in sentencing
proceedings.
This difference in formal conceptualization is important. Litigants are more likely to look for, recognize, investigate, and
advance potential claims that the law formally recognizes and defines. Cataloging and labeling signal the importance of these
claims. Formal definition provides a schema to facilitate recognition of fact patterns establishing the claim, investigation for
evidence supporting the claim, and organized presentation of that
evidence to the judge or jury.60 It also provides an accessible and
shared vocabulary for articulating and making argument regarding
the claim.61 Formal conceptualization may also impact how judges
57. No commonly used label exists for the mitigating significance of the fact that the
defendant was a war hero before he engaged in wrongdoing, that a parent sexually abused
him during his childhood, that he had recently lost a beloved life-long friend, or that he was
under intense pressure from his peer group. A reservoir of fairly amorphous terms are sometimes invoked for some facts like these. The court might say that his “traumatic experience”
should be mitigating or that his “rotten social background” or “deprived upbringing” should
be mitigating. But these are broad, amorphous terms that can easily sweep enormously different sorts of mitigations under a single umbrella and there is not any sort of consensus as to
what exactly they refer.
58. See, e.g., USSG § 5K1.1 (federal sentencing guidelines provision authorizing downward departures in sentencing for substantial assistance to authorities).
59. See, e.g., USSG § 5K2(a)(2)(B) (federal sentencing guidelines providing that “A departure may be warranted in the exceptional case in which there is present a circumstance
that the Commission has not identified in the guidelines but that nevertheless is relevant to
determining the appropriate sentence.”).
60. Litigants can easily build their investigations and presentations around the specific
and discrete elements of the claim at issue.
61. In contrast, where the law does not formally recognize potential claims, litigants may
be less likely to look for, recognize, investigate, and advance those claims. The absence of
formal recognition signals that the claim is a low status or unimportant one. Since such
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and juries process such claims, supplying a schema of specific and
discrete elements they can use to structure their assessments of the
evidence offered in support of such claims.62 This should result in
more careful, rigorous, and accurate assessment.63
In formally conceptualizing excuses but not mitigations, then,
the law makes it more likely that excuses will be recognized, investigated, and advanced, and that courts and juries will assess those
excuse claims more carefully, rigorously, and accurately.

3. Mandatory and Discretionary
The law also privileges excuses over mitigations procedurally.
The most important determinations regarding excuse claims are
mandatory, while nearly all the important determinations regarding mitigations are discretionary.
The law mandates that certain facts are excusing and that excuses have a specified legal effect when proven. When a defendant
establishes an excuse, the finder of fact must give the excuse effect
and acquit the defendant of the crime. If an intentional killer shows
that she was legally insane at the time of the killing, she is excused
and cannot be convicted of murder. These consequences follow automatically and do not depend on a decision-maker’s judgment
about the propriety of the consequence in the case at hand. In this
sense, excuses are mandatory.
claims are not cataloged, litigants are less likely to look for or recognize such claims. It may
also be more difficult to conceptualize and implement investigation of such claims. And,
without an accessible and shared vocabulary for such claims, it may be more difficult for
litigants to articulate them effectively to opponents, judges, fact-finders, and sentencers.
62. Such a schema should make it easier for them to determine whether the defendant
proved the claim (by comparing the evidence presented to the discrete and specific elements
of the claim).
63. Indeed, the experience of several Australasian jurisdictions with provocation suggests that categorization of a consideration as a mitigation may steer us away from clear
conceptualization even when clear conceptualization is readily at hand. Several Australasian
jurisdictions have recently amended provocation law such that provocation is no longer a
partial defense and is instead a sentencing factor. In the wake of this change, some courts
have used the traditional elements of the provocation defense to measure claims of provocation in the sentencing context, whereas in others “provocation has been assessed less
formally,” as though characterization of provocation as mitigation rather than defense has a
corrosive impact on its previously clear conceptualization. See Freiberg & Stewart, supra note
6, at 112. Perhaps more fundamentally, popular conceptions of mitigations appear amorphous or imprecise. As the authors of one empirical study of social attitudes toward
mitigation observe, “for the public . . . aggravating factors have a clarity which mitigating
factors lack; the significance of the latter depends heavily on personal and case characteristics which cannot be specified in advance by legislatures or guidelines authorities.” Roberts &
Hough, supra note 22, at 184.
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In contrast, mitigations are discretionary.64 Sentencers have
nearly unfettered discretion to determine (a) whether a fact is mitigating at all, (b) whether to give mitigating facts any effect in
sentencing, and (c) how much effect to give mitigating facts.

a. Discretion in Determining Whether a Fact Mitigates
Because most jurisdictions do not adopt exhaustive catalogs of
formally recognized mitigations, sentencers normally have unfettered discretion in determining whether a fact is mitigating at all.
Thus, in a case where the defendant argues that the sentencer
should treat the abuse he suffered as a child as a mitigating fact, the
sentencer is entirely free to agree or disagree. No authority mandates a conclusion one way or the other. Whether the court decides
“yes” or “no,” no appellate court will find error. Indeed, the sentencer may conclude that childhood abuse is mitigating in one
case, while not mitigating in another case, and may make a determination that is inconsistent with the determinations of other
sentencers without error.
Predictably, this results in a highly subjective and unpredictable
process. Empirical evidence shows that sentencers often disagree
about whether particular facts are mitigating.65 Indeed, some facts
are sometimes treated as mitigating facts and other times treated as
aggravating facts.66 More fundamentally, sentencers evaluate claims
64. Manson, supra note 2, at 41 (calling the administration of mitigating and aggravating
factors in sentencing “an unfettered zone of judicial discretion”).
65. Roberts, supra note 23, at 16 (discussing research showing that “many different personal mitigating factors were taken into account by sentencers, and that . . . participants
disagreed on many . . .”). Research on the attitudes of the general public also shows significant individual variation in evaluations of mitigating factors. Roberts & Hough, supra note 22,
at 183 (empirical research showing a higher degree of consensus in the public about which
factors should be deemed aggravating than about which factors should be deemed mitigating
and noting that none of the possible mitigations studied were universally recognized as
mitigating).
66. Terblanche, supra note 24, at 262 (“A large number of factors have at times been
described as either mitigating or aggravating, or even both . . .”). Intoxication, for example,
is sometimes treated as mitigating and sometimes treated as aggravating. “In Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, intoxication and substance abuse are generally regarded as
aggravating rather than mitigating,” but are sometimes seen as mitigating “when . . . linked
with social disadvantage.” Warner, supra note 25, at 139.
Similar potential for inconsistency occurs with drug addiction. An Australian high court
judge, for example, has recently “determined that drug addiction—when it is a motive for
money—[should] no longer . . . be, of itself, mitigating.” Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 190.
English case law also suggests that the fact that the offender is seriously ill is sometimes
treated as mitigating, but that it is not always treated as mitigating (either because it is treated
separately as a possible grounds for mercy or because it is not given weight in the sentencing
determination at all). Warner, supra note 25, at 138.
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for mitigation in a highly subjective way.67 Sentencers emphasize
that sentencing is “terrifying because it’s a very subjective exercise,”68 the process comes “down to what one person thinks about
another,”69 it is “about a personal and sometimes emotional response,”70 “an art, not a science,”71 and driven by “experience and
feeling”72 or by a “gut feeling rather than careful calculation.”73 Observers emphasize that assessing mitigation is “inevitably subjective”
and has an “intuitive, subjective dimension.”74 Rather than adverting theories or principles of mitigation to explain their
deliberative process, sentencers emphasize that “each case is different,” that the influence of a mitigating fact always “depends,” and
that “we’re paid to listen.”75 This suggests the process of screening
mitigation claims is unstructured and highly idiosyncratic. In one
study, sentencers reportedly “retreat[ed]” behind subjectivist platitudes like “no two cases are the same”76 and “we judge each case on
Social history and background are especially volatile in this respect. Consider the Australian experience with “disadvantaged social background.” Under Australian law,
“disadvantaged social background can be regarded as a mitigating factor . . . particularly if
there is a causal link between such a background and the offending behavior.” Id. at 128.
Moreover, disadvantaged background was routinely treated as a mitigating factor from the
1970’s to the 1990’s. Id. More recently, however, Australian courts have changed course—
citing the need to decry violence in disadvantaged communities—and have begun to treat
membership in some disadvantaged communities as a neutral factor and even as an aggravating factor. Id. at 128, 130–32. Thus, relegated to the sentencing phase and process,
“disadvantaged social background” has an ambiguous status, and a single legal system has
treated it as both mitigating and aggravating.
Indeed, things are even more complicated, for despite the common intuition that disadvantaged status should be mitigating, some research suggests that sentencers may be more
likely to treat advantaged status as mitigating. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 157–58
(noting that while sentencers are ambivalent about treating disadvantaged status as mitigating, they often treat advantaged status as mitigating (presumably because they believe odds of
reintegration are higher)). Observers have also noted the potential for flip-flopping with
respect to privileged social background. Some empirical research appears to show that
sentencers sometimes treat an offender’s privileged social background as a mitigating factor
and sometimes treat it as an aggravating factor. Id. Sentencers may see it as a mitigating
factor insofar as it suggests that the offender has heightened prospects for rehabilitation and
reintegration. Id. at 158. Sentencers may see it as aggravating insofar as it suggests the defendant “should know better.” Id. There is also inconsistency regarding offender illness.
67. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 161.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 161.
73. Id.
74. Id.; Terblanche, supra note 24, at 271 (South African system does not provide precise
definitions of sentencing factors; “the vagueness of the general principles permits a sentencer to decide on a sentence instinctively or intuitively”).
75. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 152.
76. Id., quoting ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 190 (5th ed.
2010).
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its merits.”77 The result is what we would expect from a highly subjective process: on many issues, sentencers show “marked
inconsistency,” reaching very different judgments about whether
and to what extent certain facts were mitigating.78
The approach taken by sentencing judges to . . . mitigation
tends to be second-nature and instinctual . . . . [T]hey can find
it difficult to explain why they treat a factor as . . . mitigating
. . . . [V]iews about the relevance of particular factors will differ from judge to judge, depending on their respective
background and experience.79
Thus, the sentencer’s discretion as to whether particular facts are
mitigating plays a crucial role in sentencing.

b. Discretion In Determining Whether To Give
Mitigating Facts Any Effect
In the same vein, because most jurisdictions do not mandate that
sentencers give mitigating facts any particular effect in sentencing,
they normally have unfettered discretion in deciding whether to
give mitigating facts any effect at all. That is, even if a defendant
establishes that a mitigating fact is present in his case and even if
the sentencer agrees that the fact is mitigating, the sentencer need
not adjust the sentence to reflect the mitigating fact.80 So if the defendant shows that his parents abused him, that he was raised in
desperate poverty, that he is a decorated war hero, or that he is
suffering from lung cancer, the sentencer may impose the same
sentence it would have imposed were the mitigating fact not
proven. The law does not mandate the putative consequence of mitigation—ameliorated sentence—and that consequence therefore
depends entirely on the sentencer’s judgment about its propriety in
the case at hand.
Of course, if a mitigating fact is present, the sentencer should
take this into account in setting the punishment. In fact, however,
77. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 152.
78. Id. at 154–55 (noting, for example, that judges differed widely as to whether and to
what extent willingness to receive drug treatment or evidence of a “moment of madness” at
the time of offense should be mitigating).
79. Young & King, supra note 6, at 225.
80. Of course, this is not true in the rare cases where mitigations and their ramifications
for sentence are codified and the mitigation at issue is one of the codified mitigations.
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sentencers left to their own discretion may not always do so. Indeed, sentencers are more likely to give effect to certain mitigations
in cases involving minor offenses as opposed to serious offenses81
and in cases where the defendant pled guilty as compared to cases
that went to trial,82 thus exercising their discretion not to give mitigating effect to a factor that they would have recognized as
mitigating in other cases.83 It is not hard to imagine that this could
happen in other ways too. The sentencer may believe that the range
of punishments for the crime is already too low or may have
residual doubts about the proof supporting the mitigating fact and
therefore decline to give mitigations any effect.84 More disturbingly,
the sentencer may be biased against a defendant due to defendant’s
race, nationality, socioeconomic class, or sexual orientation, or because the defendant is unattractive,85 lacks charisma, or is not
sufficiently eloquent.86 Of course, the law prohibits the sentencer
from taking some of these things into account in sentencing (e.g.,
race), but there is little precedent regarding others (e.g., attractiveness). In either case, unless the sentencer gratuitously announces
the impermissible animus behind the decision, any subsequent authority will have no basis to overturn it. Indeed, given how easily
unconscious biases can influence decision-making in complex matters absent a structured decision-making process, sentencers may
not even know that such biases are influencing their decisions. In
81. Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 158–59.
82. Id. at 160.
83. The sentencing process enables this. It grants the sentencer discretion to set the
sentence he judges appropriate (within the range allowed for the crime), and the standards
for review are extremely deferential. In most American jurisdictions, the sentencing court
need not state any reasons for the sentence it gives, with the result that “the factual substratum of their decisions is unknown or cannot be documented.” Kevin R. Reitz, Proof of
Aggravating and Mitigating Facts at Sentencing, in MITIGATION ND AGGRAVATION T SENTENCING
228, 233 (Julian Roberts ed., 2011). Moreover, in most American jurisdictions, a defendant
who appeals a sentence must normally show that “the factual basis for his sentence was
‘clearly erroneous’ or ‘lacking a minimal indicium of reliability,’ ” as well as showing
“prejudice,” meaning that any “inaccurate information had an actual impact on the sentence.” Id.
Things are different in sentencing guidelines jurisdictions—a minority of American jurisdictions—where courts typically must put their reasons on the record and “explain the effect
given to aggravating and mitigating factors.” Id.
84. As Roberts and Hough note, many claimed mitigations are difficult to prove and
depend heavily on potentially self-serving claims by the wrongdoer. See Roberts & Hough,
supra note 22, at 183.
85. See, e.g., Megan Orciari, Body Weight and Gender Influence Judgment in the Courtroom,
YALE NEWS (Jan. 8, 2013), http://news.yale.edu/2013/01/08/body-weight-and-gender-influ
ence-judgment-courtroom.
86. Roberts, supra note 23, 3–4 (noting that social distance factors may play a role in
sentencer judgments about mitigation).
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this light the sentencer’s discretion to give mitigations effect in sentencing is significant.

c. Discretion in Determining How Much Weight
to Give a Mitigating Fact
Finally, suppose that the wrongdoer shows that she was the victim
of brutal parental abuse, served heroically in the military, or is suffering from terminal lung cancer, and that the sentencer believes
that these are mitigating facts that should have an impact on the
sentence. How much should the sentencer diminish the sentence
imposed?
Most jurisdictions do not give the sentencer any guidance here.
They do not mandate that specific mitigations lead to specific adjustments in sentence. Indeed, most do not give even general
guidance about the extent to which mitigations should influence
sentence.87 Thus, even if a sentencer believes that parental abuse,
military service, or terminal lung cancer is a mitigating fact, no authority consistently mandates the extent to which the sentencer
should modify the wrongdoer’s sentence to reflect this mitigation.88
As a result, sentencers have significant discretion to weigh the mitigating facts in sentencing. Indeed, it appears that for many
sentencers the weight of a particular mitigation may vary significantly from crime to crime.89

87. See NORA DEMLEITNER, ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND
GUIDELINES 325 (Aspen 2004) (“Every U.S. jurisdiction allows judges at sentencing to consider various aspects of the defendant’s life. . . . In unstructured sentencing systems, it is
difficult to establish or measure just how much an offender’s personal background and characteristics . . . influence the sentence . . . . Most structured systems do not directly integrate
personal characteristics into the calculation . . . instead, they often allow . . . sentencing
judges to depart from the guidelines”).
88. Terblanche, supra note 24, at 262.
89. Roberts, supra note 23, at 3–4 (noting that sentencers often reach very different
conclusions about the extent to which a particular mitigating fact should mitigate the offender’s sentence). See also Warner, supra note 25, at 136 (while Canadian courts have held
that disadvantaged background should have mitigating effect, “questions remain about what
weight this factor can have . . . [and] research has shown that” the law treating disadvantaged
background as mitigating has not “reduced the rate of Aboriginal over-representation in Canada’s prison populations”).
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d. The Significance of Discretion Regarding Mitigation
There may be good reasons to make mitigation discretionary in
these various ways.90 One plausible reason is that a structured
scheme of mandatory mitigation might not do justice to the our
intuitions about mitigation. There are countless possible mitigations, and the law could not possibly catalog them all.91
Furthermore, many of these mitigations come in varying degrees of
strength. The law could not possibly calibrate punishment amelioration to the various strengths of these mitigations. Any criteria will
be too rigid and crude to properly distinguish among the multitude
of possible mitigations. Perhaps then, punting this task to the judgments and intuitions of the decision-makers in each case is better.92
Empirical research suggests that there is “strong public support for
a degree of individualization at sentencing,”93 that the public rejects
categorical rules about mitigating factors,94 and that the public supports “a sentencing model which permits courts the discretion to
make this determination.”95
Perhaps this is a good argument for making mitigation discretionary and excuses mandatory. Nevertheless, making mitigation
discretionary means treating mitigations with less care than excuses.
Even if we have a good reason for a discretionary system, leaving
the application of mitigations to the sentencer’s discretion means
running a much greater risk that she will not recognize those mitigations, will not give them effect even when recognized, and will
not give them consistent weight, and that all of the usual problems
associated with open-ended discretionary decisions, including carelessness, subjectivity, inconsistency, and explicit and implicit bias
will infect these mitigation determinations.
90. Roberts, supra note 23, at 5–6 (“[A] number of scholars . . . are of the view that
additional guidance regarding mitigation . . . is unhelpful or unwise.”). See also id. at 10
(noting concern with preserving sufficient sentencer discretion to “craft an appropriate disposition,” rather than “box-ticking”); Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 156 (“[It is]
inevitable that sentencers exercise a considerable degree of discretion”). But see id. at 163–64
(arguing that legislatures should develop frameworks to better guide sentencing discretion).
91. Shapland, supra note 36, at 63–64; Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at 156 (“Sentencing . . . involves responding to the characteristics, circumstances and life history of the
individual, which potentially brings into play any number of variables to be weighed up by
the court.”).
92. Cf. Freiberg & Stewart, supra note 6, at 110 (arguing that courts should treat provocation as mitigation, not excuse, because the process for adjudicating mitigations is flexible
enough to take into account nuances of provocation cases, in a way that the guilty phase
cannot).
93. Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at 176.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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4. Procedural Safeguards
Criminal law also privileges excuses over mitigations by significantly relaxing the rules and safeguards that apply when litigating
mitigating facts. There is no right to a jury determination regarding
sentence and, thus, no right to a jury regarding mitigating facts.
Likewise, the rules of evidence that apply at the guilt phase do not
apply in the sentencing phase, resulting in dramatically relaxed restrictions on the evidence offered for and against mitigations at
sentencing.96 Many constitutional protections that apply during the
guilt phase do not apply at the sentencing phase, including exclusionary rules97 and the right to confront witnesses.98 Indeed, while it
is well established that defendants have a constitutional right to present a defense, whether and to what extent they have a right to
present any sentencing evidence at all remains unclear.
There may be good reasons not to carry over these requirements
and safeguards. “[S]entencing facts tend to be more numerous and
subjective than trial facts. Cumbersome rules of process are more
expensive, and less workable, in an adjudicative milieu of complexities and shades of grey.”99 In addition, such relaxed standards may
facilitate a “wide-open factual inquiry” encouraging a “rehabilitative
treatment model of sentencing” by developing the most complete
information about the offender.100
Nevertheless, this arrangement has the practical consequence of
privileging excuses. The sentencing phase is typically an informal
adjunct to the guilt phase, where demanding formal requirements
give way to a largely unstructured and open-ended review. The result, in contemporary American practice is that sentencing is
usually an afterthought. Defendants rarely present extensive evidence in mitigation beyond their own allocutions, and the entire
sentencing phase typically lasts less than thirty minutes.101 The relaxed standards of the sentencing phase appear part-and-parcel
96. See DEMLEITNER, ET AL., supra note 87, at 364 (“Most states allow sentencing judges to
consider evidence inadmissible under the rules of evidence”).
97. See id. at 454 (“Most jurisdictions allow sentencing judges to consider evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, even when that evidence is
suppressed at trial”).
98. See id. at 365 (“courts . . . have mostly concluded that the Confrontation Clause does
not apply to the evidence presented during a sentencing hearing”).
99. Reitz, supra note 83, at 232.
100. Id. at 239.
101. See Reitz, supra note 83, at 231 (“In the United States, a typical sentencing was once
reported to consume less than thirty minutes . . . an estimate that should probably be reduced for the busier court systems of the twenty-first century”); see also PAUL BERGMAN & SARA
J. BERGMAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS, SURVIVE THE SYSTEM, 488
(13th ed. 2013) (“The sentencing portion of a criminal case often takes only moments”).
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with a broader disinterest in claims made at sentencing compared
to those made at the guilt phase.

C. Facts A and B Revisited
Suppose, again,102 that I have killed intentionally and would normally be guilty of murder and that either Fact A is true (as a result
of a mental disease I do not substantially appreciate the wrongfulness of my conduct) or Fact B is true (my father physically and
sexually abused me throughout my childhood).
My attorney will very likely consider, sua sponte, whether Fact A
(insanity) is true in my case, for Fact A would straightforwardly trigger the insanity defense, and insanity is one of the items in the
standard catalog of excuses. Every criminal defense attorney should
consider whether the defendant might qualify for any of the items
on this list shortly after taking on any case. Moreover, because the
criminal code provides a readily available schema defining the excuse, my attorney is likely to recognize Fact A as potentially
triggering the insanity excuse as soon as he compares the facts he
knows about me with the elements of the excuse. He is also likely to
seek supporting evidence more effectively, insofar as the schema’s
elements will guide him to search for particular sorts of facts. Of
course, being more likely to look for, recognize, and effectively investigate this potential excuse, my attorney is more likely to advance
it on my behalf. When he does so, the formal schema will provide
him a ready-made vocabulary for articulating this claim to opposing
counsel, judge, and jury
Should the case go to trial, my claim will enjoy the benefits of
several important procedural protections. I will have the constitutional right to present my defense, to receive a jury determination,
to confront witnesses who oppose my defense, and to suppress illegally acquired evidence against my defense. Furthermore, should I
succeed in proving the existence of Fact A, the trial court must recognize my insanity defense and acquit me of murder.
Things are very different for Fact B (history of abuse). Although
this is one of the better known potential grounds for mitigation, the
law does not formally conceptualize it. As a result, my attorney is
not as likely to look for evidence of my abuse sua sponte and is less
likely to recognize its presence or its mitigating significance. Moreover, because the law does not provide an elemental schema for this
102. See Introduction, supra, for hypothetical.
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potential mitigation, my attorney will find it challenging to investigate this potential mitigation. As a result, my attorney is less likely to
advance claims based on Fact B than those based on Fact A.
Should my attorney seek to advance a claim rooted in Fact B, he
will likely find it more challenging to articulate those claims effectively because the law does not provide a ready-made vocabulary for
doing so. Nor will I have a constitutional right to advance such
claims, a right to a jury determination, a right to confront opposing
witnesses, or a right to suppress illegally acquired evidence against
Fact B.
Even if I do establish the existence of Fact B, doing so will not
block my conviction for murder, for Fact B is at best a mitigation,
and mitigations do not block conviction. Nor will it change either
the maximum or minimum punishments possible in my case. At
most, Fact B will lead the sentencer to reduce the sentence she
would otherwise have imposed, but she will have nearly unfettered
discretion to decide how much to reduce the sentence. Indeed, the
sentencer will be free to decide that Fact B is not mitigating at all,
or that, even though Fact B is mitigating, it should not impact my
sentence.
Thus, the criminal law handles facts like Fact A very differently
from Fact B. Fact A will change the outcome of the case; Fact B
cannot. The law formally conceptualizes Fact A but not Fact B. Fact
A has mandatory consequences; Fact B does not. And litigation regarding Fact A is subject to important procedural safeguards that
do not apply to litigation about Fact B. In short, Fact A, as an excusing fact, is privileged. Fact B, a mere mitigation, is relegated to the
margins of criminal process.

III. A FRAMEWORK FOR CATEGORIZING EXCUSING
AND MITIGATING FACTS
Given the profound differences in handling excusing and mitigating facts, treating a fact as mitigating or excusing matters a great
deal. This Part sketches a framework for determining whether facts
are excusing or mitigating, one that can be used to understand the
excuses and mitigations currently available and to properly categorize new kinds of facts as they arise.
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A. The Framework
The foundation of this framework is that it scrupulously respects
the relationship between responsibility and excuse. On this account, facts have excusing significance if they diminish the
responsibility of the wrongdoer. This account entails a scalar model
of responsibility, on which it is possible for excusing facts to diminish responsibility—and thus excuse—to different degrees.103
In contrast, mitigation is not a matter of responsibility. Facts have
mitigating significance so long as they favor diminished punishment. Facts may do this in a variety of ways. Of course, excusing
facts will normally also qualify as mitigating facts because facts that
diminish responsibility will normally also favor diminished punishment. Many mitigating facts, however, will not qualify as excusing
facts because many facts that favor diminished punishment do not
diminish responsibility.

1. What Makes a Fact Excusing?
On this account, a fact that diminishes the responsibility of a
wrongdoer is an excusing fact.
Applying this account is easiest in conjunction with a theory of
responsibility, for such an account shows what is required for a
wrongdoer to be responsible and thus facilitates assessment of
whether the fact at issue diminishes responsibility. On a theory of
responsibility that makes “free will” a requirement (as some do),
facts that defeat or diminish free will are excusing facts.104 On a
theory of responsibility requiring the capacity for rational thought,
susceptibility to empathy, a particular degree of “responsiveness to
103. As philosopher Tamler Sommers notes, while theories of responsibility must “offer a
way to determine how much blame or punishment an agent deserves,” “this aspect of the
debate does not receive as much attention,” Tammler Sommers, Partial Desert, in OXFORD
STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY (David Shoemaker ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at
3) (on file with author), and “it is surprisingly difficult to find discussions of the degrees of
moral responsibility in the philosophical literature.” Id. at 3 n.4. Sommers suggests this may
be because “theories of moral responsibility tend to be framed in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions.” Id.
104. Many traditional theories of responsibility make free will a prerequisite for responsibility. However, there is a long-standing debate about what exactly “free will” is, with some
theories requiring what is sometimes called “contra-causal” free will, and other theories requiring something narrower, such as “freedom from constraint.” For an overview of this
debate, see Anders Kaye, The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
365, 369–80 (2007).
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reasons,”105 or “identification” between desire and will,106 facts that
show the wrongdoer lacks these characteristics are excusing facts.107
Thus, applying this schema requires two steps: consulting a theory
of responsibility to identify its requirements and determining
whether the fact at issue negates or diminishes any of those requirements. If it does, it is an excusing fact.
There is, however, a long-standing and on-going controversy
about which theory of responsibility is best.108 Fortunately, applying
this framework is possible without an established account of responsibility in hand. This can be done by consulting our responsibilityrelated intuitions about the facts at issue in particular cases, considering whether potentially excusing facts trigger the intuition that
the wrongdoer’s responsibility has been diminished. If, for example, the wrongdoer was so mentally ill that he could not tell right
from wrong, does this elicit the intuition that his responsibility is
therefore diminished or negated? Although it may initially seem
strange to make such judgments in the absence of a worked-out
theory of responsibility, this is not an illegitimate way to proceed.
Theorists commonly derive accounts of responsibility by aggregating and synthesizing moral intuitions about specific cases.109 This
suggests that such intuitions are themselves important data for
identifying the requirements of responsibility. So, even without a
systematic theory of responsibility, determining whether particular
facts diminish responsibility is possible.
On either approach, the critical question is whether the fact at
issue diminishes the wrongdoer’s responsibility. A fact may do this
either (a) by negating responsibility or (b) by reducing
responsibility.
105. See, e.g., JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL (1998)
(providing the seminal discussion of reasons-responsiveness account of responsibility).
106. See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE WILL
(Gary Watson ed., 1982); Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
107. Peter Aranella and other theorists have suggested that the law cannot properly hold
a person responsible unless that person has an array of capacities that include the capacity
for empathy. Peter Aranella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between
Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1151 (1992).
108. Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2004 Edition), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/arch
ives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism (last visited September 1, 2013) (identifying at least six
different families of responsibility theories with each family encompassing several variants).
109. For one interesting reflection on this approach, see Eddy Nahmias et al., Surveying
Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PSYCH. 561, 561–62
(2005) (“Such intuitions play a conspicuous role in the free will debate, where philosophers
often motivate their position by claiming that it is commonsensical, fits with ordinary intuitions, accounts for our practices of attributing moral responsibility, and captures a
conception of freedom we value.”).
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A fact negates responsibility if that fact either (i) entirely eliminates responsibility or a prerequisite of responsibility or (ii) reduces
some prerequisite of responsibility below the minimum necessary
threshold for responsibility.110 If relying on untheorized intuitions,
analyzing responsibility in terms of prerequisites will not come naturally, and this analysis will focus primarily on the first clause of
prong (i). If adopting a theory of responsibility that identifies prerequisites for responsibility, the analysis can focus on the second
clause of prong (i) and on prong (ii).
Thus, suppose we adopt a theory that requires a responsible person to be at least moderately responsive to reasons.111 A fact
showing the wrongdoer not at all responsive to reasons would entirely eliminate a prerequisite of responsibility. A fact showing the
wrongdoer only weakly responsive to reasons would show that the
wrongdoer’s reasons-responsiveness did not meet the minimum
threshold necessary for responsibility. In both cases, the fact at issue
negates a prerequisite for responsibility, making the fact excusing.
Thus, so far, facts are excusing if they:
(a) negate responsibility in that they either (i) entirely eliminate responsibility or a prerequisite of responsibility or
(ii) reduce a prerequisite of responsibility below the minimum threshold necessary for responsibility.
Facts can also be excusing if they reduce responsibility or a prerequisite for responsibility. In these cases, the actor is responsible
or meets the minimum prerequisites for responsibility, but the actor is subnormal with respect to responsibility or a prerequisite of
responsibility. So, if we have a theory that identifies the prerequisites for responsibility and if such a prerequisite is scalar, we can
compare the actor’s level of that prerequisite with that prerequisite’s “normal” level. For example, suppose responsibility requires
at least moderate responsiveness to reasons, IQ is positively related
to responsiveness to reasons, and a wrongdoer has an IQ of seventyfive (commonly characterized as borderline mental retardation).
The wrongdoer’s very low IQ will not eliminate his responsiveness
to reasons or render the wrongdoer only weakly responsive to reasons. (A person with an IQ of seventy-five will make distinctions
110. Like Hannah Tierney’s model, this is a scalar model of responsibility, and, like Tierney’s, this model assumes the most plausible version of a scalar model includes minimum
thresholds. Hannah Tierney, A Maneuver Around the Modified Manipulation Argument, 165
PHIL. STUDIES 753 (2013).
111. This is an intentionally modified variant of Fischer and Ravizza’s influential account
of responsibility. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 105.
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among many sorts of reasons and will respond to a wide array of
reasons, qualifying as at least “moderately” reasons-responsive.) As a
result, this fact will not negate a prerequisite for responsibility, but
it may reduce one because it may make the wrongdoer less responsive to reasons than a normal person.112 Thus, an IQ of seventy-five
would reduce a prerequisite for responsibility and qualify as an excusing fact.
Of course, facts that negate responsibility and those that merely
reduce responsibility are distinguishable. The former plainly show
that the wrongdoer is not responsible. The latter, in contrast, will
not defeat responsibility. The actor meets the minimum requirements for responsibility and is therefore responsible.
Nevertheless, both are excusing facts. The former are completely
excusing The latter are partially excusing. When the former are
true, the wrongdoer is not responsible for any wrong. When the
latter are true, the wrongdoer may be responsible for a wrong, but
the extent of his responsibility is less than the responsibility of a
normal actor who has done the same thing.
Of course, this leaves open how to manifest such a partial excuse
in responses to wrongdoing. It may seem implausible that partial
excuses will entirely block blame or criminal conviction, at least
when they do not come relatively close in magnitude to complete
excuses. It may also seem implausible that we can construct a menu
of offenses for which people can be convicted that will perfectly (or
even loosely) track all the gradations of responsibility that a person
might have, once responsibility is treated in this scalar fashion and
takes into account partially excusing facts. The Parts that follow will
explore the significance of characterizing a fact as partially excusing in more detail.
For now, though, we have a rubric for identifying excusing facts.
Facts are excusing if they
(a) [complete excuses] negate responsibility by either (i) entirely eliminating responsibility or a prerequisite of
responsibility or (ii) reducing a prerequisite of responsibility below the minimum threshold for responsibility,
or if they

112. Accept for the sake of argument that low IQ has a positive relationship to reasonsresponsiveness.
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(b) [partial excuses] reduce responsibility or a prerequisite of
responsibility (but not to the degree necessary to negate
responsibility).
This framework accounts for the most widely recognized excuses.
Some apply when the wrongdoer’s responsibility is negated because
something entirely eliminates a feature necessary for responsibility.
For example, the common law version of the insanity defense excuses offenders who entirely lack the capacity to tell right from
wrong. Most sophisticated accounts of responsibility posit that a
person is not responsible unless she has at least some capacity to
“recognize the True and the Good”113—minimal “moral competence.”114 A person who cannot tell right from wrong entirely lacks
this essential feature and is therefore not responsible.
Other excuses apply to cases in which a condition or circumstance negates responsibility by reducing a feature necessary for
responsibility so that the feature does not meet the minimum
threshold for responsibility. The cognitive prong of the Model Penal Code’s version of the insanity defense, for example, excuses
offenders who lack the “substantial capacity” to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct.115 Such actors may have some
residual capacity to distinguish right from wrong, but it is so deeply
impaired that they do not have even the minimal degree of normative competence necessary for responsibility. The control prong of
the Code’s insanity defense likewise excuses offenders who lack the
substantial capacity to control their conduct—actors who may have
some residual capacity for control but not enough to meet the minimum executive function necessary for responsibility.116
Finally, some excuses apply in cases where a condition or circumstance reduces (but does not negate) a capacity necessary for
responsibility. For example, the provocation defense reduces murder to manslaughter in cases where the offender acted in an
adequately provoked heat of passion. The offender’s anger may impair the offender’s capacity to reason effectively or his capacity to
control his conduct, though not so far as to negate the minimum
normative and executive capacities necessary for responsibility.
Since the impairment does not negate those capacities, a full excuse is not appropriate, but a partial excuse recognizes the
wrongdoer’s diminished executive or cognitive capacities compared
113. SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 71 (1990).
114. R.J. WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994).
115. AM. L. INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES [hereinafter the Code]
§ 4.01(1) (1980).
116. Id.
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to non-provoked offenders committing otherwise similar offenses.
Likewise, many jurisdictions hold that voluntary intoxication may
be a defense to a specific intent crime but not to a general intent
crime. The functional result is a partial excuse117: voluntary intoxication relieves the defendant of liability for a greater offense but
leaves the defendant liable for a lesser one (insofar as most specific
intent offenses have lesser included offenses with general intent elements). In these cases, intoxication may impair the offender’s
cognitive or executive capacities but not so far as to negate the minimum capacities necessary for responsibility. Thus, though a full
excuse is not appropriate, a partial excuse recognizes the wrongdoer’s diminished executive or cognitive capacities as compared to
non-provoked offenders committing otherwise similar offenses.
2. What Makes a Fact Mitigating?
Under this framework, responsibility is not the touchstone for
mitigation. Rather, facts are mitigating so long as they favor diminished punishment. It is true that, under these criteria, excusing
facts will also be mitigating facts because negating or diminishing
the responsibility of the wrongdoer also favors diminished punishment. The criterion for categorizing such facts as mitigating,
however, is not that they diminish responsibility but that they favor
diminished punishment. Conversely, mitigating facts will not necessarily qualify as excusing facts because many facts that favor
diminished punishment do not diminish the wrongdoer’s responsibility. Thus, the touchstone for mitigation is fundamentally
different from that of excuse. It is not responsibility-reduction but
punishment-reduction.
Here, again, theoretical criteria might assist the analysis.118 For
example, a retributive or utilitarian theory of punishment119 might
specify when punishment is justified and provide criteria for determining the appropriate amount.
Nevertheless, adopting a theory for these purposes is not essential.120 Again, unsystemized intuitions about mitigation in particular
117. For an illustration of the partial defense reading of the voluntary intoxication defense, see DRESSLER, supra note 6, at § 26.02[B][3].
118. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 8 (considering and rejecting linking codified mitigation to “statutory purposes of sentencing”); Ashworth, supra note 27, at 24–25 (noting that
some standard sentencing factors are not rooted in theories of desert and deterrence).
119. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 8 (noting that sentencing factors are not always
justifiable on a “retributive principle or utilitarian basis”).
120. Indeed, some are skeptical that sentencing factors conform to a theory of punishment. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 8, 12; Manson, supra note 2, at 41 (stating that “a
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cases may be sufficient. Most people have robust intuitions about
mitigation.121 Indeed, even in this tough-on-crime era, empirical research shows that most people intuitively find a wide array of factors
mitigating.122 Such intuitions can be used to assess whether potentially mitigating facts trigger the intuition that the wrongdoer’s
punishment should be reduced. If the wrongdoer served heroically
in a war, is suffering from terminal lung-cancer, or was abused by
his father, do such facts elicit the intuition that his punishment
should be reduced? If so, it is fair to call them mitigating facts.123
As the taxonomy of mitigating facts in Part II suggests, common
intuitions appear to cast facts as mitigating for diverse reasons.
Some seem associated with the offender’s desert. For example, facts
that diminish an actor’s responsibility seem to favor diminished
punishment—the robber with borderline subnormal intelligence
should receive less punishment than the one with above-average intelligence, and the killer who acted under non-excusing duress
should receive less punishment than one who did not—at least in
part because these actors are not as responsible for their wrongdoings. Likewise, facts that diminish the wrongfulness of an offense
also seem to favor reduced punishment. Though guilty of the same
offense, the robber who takes care not to endanger his victims
should receive less punishment than one who callously puts them at
great risk, the conspirator who plays a minor role should receive
less punishment than one who plays a central role, and the killer
who reluctantly commits euthanasia at the request of the victim
should receive less punishment than the one who kills out of greed.
The former facts (diminishing responsibility) will also qualify as excusing facts under the schema developed here. The latter facts
(diminishing wrongfulness) might, analogously, qualify as justifying
search for principles” of mitigation in contemporary sentencing practice “leaves us with the
recognition that there are some accepted factors which fit easily into a typology but others
that are difficult to categorize” and arguing that “we shall not find a philosophical principle,
or principles, that will define mitigating factors adequately”); Roberts & Hough, supra note
22, at 179 (noting that the general public gives significant mitigating weight to offender
remorse and assistance to law enforcement though this appears inconsistent with the retributive account of punishment); Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 200–01 (study suggesting that the
general public places significant mitigating weight on factors not relevant to culpability).
121. Lovegrove’s research suggests that the “threshold for invoking mitigation [is] low,”
and facts are “not required to be exceptional to be deemed relevant” to mitigation.
Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 202.
122. Roberts & Hough, supra note 22, at 176–77.
123. There may be reasons to be cautious about relying on intuitions to identify mitigating facts. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 23, at 2 (“Intuition alone is often a poor guide to
principled sentencing.”). This Article, however, takes the view that there is a connection
between mitigating practices and intuitive reactions to offenses and offenders, so this Article’s descriptive account of mitigation will sometimes tie the former to the latter.
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facts (though exploring this possibility is beyond the scope of this
Article). In both cases, the desert-reducing character of these facts
appears to trigger the intuition that punishment should be
reduced.124
Facts may trigger these intuitions in other ways, too. Sometimes,
utilitarian considerations are the catalyst. For example, it appears
that facts diminishing the future dangerousness of the offender
favor diminished punishment, perhaps because incapacitating the
low-danger offender prevents less expected harm than incapacitating the high-danger offender. This may explain why it is mitigating
that an offender is terminally ill, frail with age, or unusually susceptible to rehabilitation. Perhaps it also helps explain why the
offender’s remorse or voluntary restitution, or positive facts about
his personal history, like his good criminal record or his service to
the community, are sometimes seen as mitigating. These facts
might imply that the offender is less likely to be dangerous or more
likely to make positive contributions in the future than other offenders, making extended incapacitation less useful. Such
utilitarian intuitions may also come into play with facts that increase
the costs of inflicting punishment. At least sometimes, such facts
seem to favor diminished punishment, as where the offender is unusually vulnerable to the punishment, where the offender’s family
or community will suffer to an unusual degree if he is punished, or
where the offender is unusually likely to make positive contributions when not punished (e.g., where the offender has unusual
education or skills). Utility may also help explain why sentencers
are often inclined to diminish punishment for those who plead
guilty or assist the prosecution of others; in these cases, using reduced punishment to incentivize assistance in the administration of
criminal justice results in significant benefits
Still other facts are commonly seen as mitigating because they
elicit sympathy or compassion for the offender. This may come into
play with some of the mitigating facts already discussed, such as
those that diminish responsibility (e.g., impairment and duress),
those that show sympathetic motives (as in the euthanasia case),
and those that suggest that punishment will cause the offender unusual suffering. This may also explain why reducing punishment
appears appropriate where the offender has suffered in certain

124. Desert-driven intuitions may also come into play where facts show that the offender
has already suffered because of his crime. In such cases, one may feel that the offender has
already paid some of the price his crime demands, such that he deserves less punishment
than similarly situated offenders who have paid no price.
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ways, as in cases of abuse, deprivation, poverty, or other sorts of
involuntary suffering.
So far, then, it appears that facts are likely to trigger the intuition
that punishment should be reduced where they (i) diminish the
wrongdoer’s responsibility, (ii) diminish the wrongfulness of his
act, (iii) show that the wrongdoer has already paid some of the deserved price, (iv) diminish the benefits of inflicting punishment, (v)
increase the costs of inflicting punishment, (vi) show that reducing
punishment will produce a benefit, or (vi) elicit sympathy or compassion for the wrongdoer. Given the diversity of the universe of
mitigating facts, it is unlikely that this is an exhaustive list of the
ways in which facts might trigger the intuition that punishment
should be diminished. For the purposes of this Article’s assessment
of the boundary between mitigation and excuse, however, the following expanded schema for excuse and mitigation will guide the
analysis:
(1) Facts are excusing if they (a) [complete excuses] negate
responsibility by either (i) entirely eliminating a prerequisite of responsibility or (ii) reducing a prerequisite of
responsibility below the minimum threshold for responsibility, or if they (b) [partial excuses] reduce a prerequisite
of responsibility (but not to the degree necessary to negate responsibility).
(2) Facts are mitigating if they favor reduction of punishment,
for any of the diverse reasons that facts might favor reduced punishment, including, but not limited to:
(i) diminishing the wrongdoer’s responsibility, (ii) diminishing the wrongfulness of his act, (iii) showing that the
wrongdoer has already paid some of the deserved price,
(iv) diminishing the benefits of inflicting punishment, (v)
increasing the costs of inflicting punishment, (vi) showing
that reducing punishment will produce a benefit, (vii)
eliciting sympathy or compassion for the wrongdoer, or
(viii) otherwise favoring reduction of punishment.

B. Revisiting the Differences in How We Treat Excuse and Mitigation
Part II asked why the criminal law treats excusing and mitigating
facts so differently. The schema for excusing and mitigating facts
developed in this Part suggests a possible answer: excuses are more
important.
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Excuses are about criminal responsibility: they arise where responsibility has been negated or diminished. Mitigations are about
calibrating individual punishment to fulfill the various purposes of
punishment: they arise when reducing punishment will best fulfill
the purpose of punishing the offender. Perhaps accurate determinations regarding criminal responsibility are more important than
accurately calibrating individual punishments to the purposes of
punishment. After all, the responsibility assessment is in some sense
more fundamental than and preliminary to the calibration of punishment, for it determines whether there will be any punishment at
all and, in the case of partial excuse, sets the parameters of the
punishment to be calibrated. Likewise, the responsibility assessment
seems like a more profound or more penetrating assessment of the
wrongdoer, addressing his basic agency and even whether he qualifies for personhood at all. Much less is at stake at the time of the
punishment calibration because the basic agency and personhood
of the wrongdoer have already been established. On yet another
dimension, the responsibility assessment seems like a more fundamental or profound assessment of the wrongdoer’s relation to his
wrong, for in asking whether the wrongdoer is responsible for his
wrong, we are asking whether he has the sort of deep connection to
that act that justifies calling him a criminal. By the time of the punishment calibration, we have already established that this deep
connection exists, and the punishment calibration seems to occupy
itself with the finer nuances of that connection. Perhaps, then, the
responsibility assessment is more important—more fundamental,
more profound, more penetrating, more revealing—than the punishment calibration. That is, excuse is more important than
mitigation.
It is not obviously correct that excuse is more important than
mitigation, and, even if this is correct, whether this justifies treating
excuses differently. For the moment, however, this hierarchy might
explain why excusing facts are treated so much more carefully and
rigorously than mitigating facts.
But if excuse is more important than mitigation, this has a significant implication for the line between the two. Having developed a
special framework for handling excuses and having done so because excuse is so important to criminal justice, the criminal law
should be scrupulous when deciding whether any particular sort of
fact is excusing or mitigating, and discovering categorization errors
should be dismaying.
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Unfortunately, there is reason to think that conventional practice
makes such categorization errors. Viewing the conventional taxonomy of excusing and mitigating facts in Part II through the schema
for excuse and mitigation in Part III brings out problems in the
taxonomy. While some of the categorizations in that taxonomy remain uncontroversial, the categorization of others now seems less
secure. This is especially true of certain potentially mitigating facts
that have plausible claims to excusing significance under the
schema but which conventional taxonomy exiles to mitigation.

A. Uncontroversially Excusing
This Article’s schema for excuse and mitigation does not upset
everything in the conventional taxonomy. On the contrary, many of
the categorizations remain uncontroversial. For example, the
schema does not destabilize the categorization of conventional excuses. Facts that establish traditionally-defined infancy,
subnormality, or insanity are easily understood to either eliminate a
prerequisite for responsibility or reduce that prerequisite below the
minimum threshold for responsibility. Facts that establish diminished capacity appear to reduce the extent to which a prerequisite
for responsibility is present, even if not to the degree necessary to
negate responsibility. Facts showing duress and provocation are also
conventionally understood to reduce the responsibility of the
wrongdoer. On one account, for example, they generate intense
emotions of a sort that impairs the cognitive and executive capacities required for responsibility. On another, they present
inducements to wrongful behavior that are so difficult to resist that
they make it unfair to hold an inflicted person responsible for acting wrongfully. Either way, such circumstances diminish the
responsibility of the wrongdoer and are therefore excusing.
Of course, the facts that trigger these excuses are also mitigating,
in part because they diminish the responsibility of the wrongdoer,
and this in turn favors reduced punishment. It is also true, however,
that many conventional excuses appear to favor reduced punishment for other reasons. The fact that a person is an infant, for
example, inspires sympathy and protective feelings, and these feelings may themselves favor reduced punishment. Similar
responsibility-independent stories are available for many of the
other traditional excuses. The important thing under the schema is
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that these sorts of facts all qualify as excusing. Qualifying as excusing facts, they have a presumptive claim to the scrupulous
protections afforded to excuses.

B. Uncontroversially Mitigating
At the same time, the schema leaves some of the standard potential mitigations firmly in the mitigation camp. For example, it is
difficult to see how an offender subsequently pleading guilty or assisting a prosecution can reduce the offender’s responsibility for his
prior wrong.125 As a result, it is implausible that these facts favor
reduced punishment because they negate or diminish responsibility. If that is correct, these facts can only be mitigating but not
excusing. The same can be said if the offender is abnormally vulnerable to normal punishments (e.g., because of her illness or
advanced age) or if punishing the offender will do abnormal damage to his family or community. Such forward-looking facts about
the consequences of inflicting punishment say nothing about
whether the offender was fully responsible for his offense. They do
not show that he lacked any capacity associated with responsibility,
did not identify with or own his conduct in a way that undercuts
responsibility, or faced any challenge or circumstances making it
unfair to hold him responsible. As a result, it is implausible that
these facts favor reduced punishment because they negate or diminish responsibility. The same is likely true of facts showing the
offender’s post-crime suffering (such as recent bereavement) or
post-crime non-state sanctions (such as loss of employment). Such
facts are sometimes presented as mitigating, perhaps because the
offender’s past suffering can be seen as a kind of pre-payment on
punishment or because there is less call for inflicting suffering
125. Olusanya makes a similar observation. Olusanya, supra note 7, at 23 (“[V]oluntary
surrender; a guilty plea . . . and the post-conflict conduct of the accused . . . constitute
mitigating circumstances because they do not have the same intrinsic connection to moral
blame as excuse defenses.” This is because they are “characteristics of the actor that are
temporally and causally separate from the act . . . they are therefore only relevant to
penalties.”).
It is still possible to imagine a responsibility-related explanation here. For example, if
willingness to plead guilty or assist prosecution is indicative of good character, a responsibility-related explanation on the model of the good-character facts discussed in the next Part
may be possible. Such stories seem strained, however, when applied to guilty pleas and assisting prosecution, not least because these behaviors seem best explained as self-interested,
rather than indicia of good character. See also Terblanche, supra note 24, at 275 (flagging the
question of whether a guilty plea reduces an offender’s blameworthiness and noting that the
issue has been debated extensively elsewhere).
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where significant suffering has already occurred.126 It does not appear, however, that such facts can have any bearing on the
wrongdoer’s responsibility for the crime. If this is so, they are not
excusing and remain un-controversially mitigating.

C. The Exiles: Traditional Mitigations That May Actually Be Excusing
Though the schema does not put any pressure on the taxonomy’s categorizations of the uncontroversially excusing and
mitigating facts above, things are more complicated with some of
the other traditional potentially mitigating facts. Upon closer review, it appears that several different kinds of traditionally
mitigating facts have responsibility-related explanations in addition
to their responsibility-independent ones. In this light, placing them
in the camp of mitigation is problematic. They look like excuses in
exile, stripped of excuse status and all it entails, without good
reason.

1. Facts Suggesting Good Character
Several categories of conventionally mitigating facts seem to suggest that the offender has a better character than most people who
commit his crime and that this is a reason to punish him less. One
possible explanation for why such good-character facts favor diminished punishment is that they suggest that the offender is not as
responsible for his offense as he might otherwise appear. If this is
right, then good-character facts are excusing.
Perhaps the most common examples of good-character facts are
those showing that the wrongdoer had no criminal record before
the charged offense, that he had a history of good deeds or heroism, or that he had a record of service to his community. Such facts
are often taken to favor diminished punishment and therefore
characterized as mitigating. However, as the schema highlights,
there is more than one possible reason why such facts favor diminished punishment, and some such reasons favor categorization as
an excuse. Indeed, one plausible explanation takes these good126. See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 27, at 31 (“[I]n Sweden factors of this kind are rationalized as ‘natural punishment’: the burglar who is injured while committing the offense has
inflicted some ‘punishment’ on himself, and therefore requires less state punishment”). Ashworth is skeptical about this sort of reasoning. Id. See also Jacobson & Hough, supra note 11, at
149.
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character facts to show that the wrongdoer was not fully responsible
for his wrongdoing.
On this explanation, such facts raise the possibility that the
wrongdoer has a much better character than his wrongdoing suggests. His better-than-expected character raises the possibility that
his wrongful act was “out of character” or aberrant. This, in turn,
raises the possibility that his offense is not fully attributable to
him—perhaps because some circumstance or condition has distorted the usual relationship between the actor and his action.
While this analysis would likely carry little weight for theories of
responsibility that focus solely on the wrongdoer’s capacities or
freedom to choose at the time of the offense, it might resonate
more strongly for character and identification accounts of responsibility and for those whose intuitions tie responsibility attribution to
the offender’s “ownership” of his offense. According to such theories and intuitions, it is problematic to attribute responsibility for an
act to a person if that person’s character is not connected to it in a
sufficiently deep way. Good-character facts about wrongdoers suggest that the required deep connection is missing. In this way, they
suggest that the wrongdoer was not (or was not fully) responsible
for his bad act.
Similar analysis is possible for other traditional mitigations. Facts
suggesting a more promising future than most offenders—e.g., unusual susceptibility to rehabilitation or reintegration, likelihood to
do good deeds, or diminished dangerousness compared to other
offenders—are often treated as mitigating. Such facts are normally
presented as forward-looking, but perhaps they favor diminished
punishment for backward-looking reasons. Maybe the real import
of the facts that show the wrongdoer’s promising future is that they
show he has a better character than his wrongdoing suggests, thus
raising the possibility that his wrongful act was out of character and
thus not really or fully attributable to him.
Similar analysis applies to redeeming facts about a wrongdoer,
such as feeling remorse, repairing damage done, or seeking rehabilitation. Such facts are sometimes taken to favor reduced
punishment and, therefore, characterized as mitigating facts, but it
is also possible that these sorts of facts favor reduced punishment
because they diminish the wrongdoer’s responsibility for his wrong.
They might show that he has a much better character than his
wrongdoing suggests. In showing his better-than-expected character, they raise the possibility that his wrongful act was out of
character and that his offense is not really or fully attributable to
him, making these too look like excusing facts.
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There are other ways to explain why these sorts of facts favor reduced punishment, including ways that do not involve
responsibility. For example, these facts suggest that the wrongdoer
will not be as dangerous or destructive in the future as others who
commit similar offenses.127 If so, society benefits less from incapacitating these comparatively less dangerous offenders, and this may
favor reduced punishment. Likewise, if these good-future offenders
will contribute more to their families and communities after punishment, allowing them to return to society sooner is preferable.
Perhaps inflicting punishment on an actually virtuous person will
be destructive to her virtue, such that diminishing punishment
would be preferable,128 or perhaps rewarding virtue is an incentive
to virtue and punishment-reduction is the reward. Alternatively,
such facts may suggest that the wrongdoer has already paid something to the community through his prior constructive, supportive,
or protective act. If punishment is considered restitution, such prepayment may reduce the appropriate amount of punishment. In
other words, as each of these possibilities shows, such facts may
favor reduced punishment for reasons having nothing to do with
responsibility. If so, these facts do not have excusing significance
and should remain squarely in the mitigation camp.
There is, then, more than one plausible way to explain why goodcharacter facts favor reduced punishment. On one explanation,
they undercut attribution of responsibility. If this is correct, goodcharacter facts are excusing. On another, they favor diminished
punishment for reasons unrelated to responsibility. If this is correct, good-character facts are merely mitigating. Unfortunately,
there is little in the literature or the case law that helps resolve this
uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is possible that these good-character
facts have been mischaracterized and that they are excusing facts
exiled to the realm of mitigation.

2. Non-Excusing Handicaps
Some other categories of facts traditionally treated as mitigating
appear to be possible exiles too. One such category includes handicaps that are typically treated as mitigations rather than excuses.
127. Berry, supra note 8, at 256; Manson, supra note 2, at 45.
128. Cf. Ashworth, supra note 27, at 29 (“[A] court’s failure to recognize positive contributions might be taken symbolically to downgrade those contributions, and to undermine
their value.”).
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Examples include non-excusing infancy,129 non-excusing insanity,130 and non-excusing intellectual impairment.131 In such
cases, the handicap is closely related to a handicap that is legally
excusing, but does not rise to the level required to trigger that excuse. Although the handicap does not trigger the excuse, it still
favors some reduction in punishment. All else being equal, the punishment for a robber with less than normal intelligence should be
less than that for one who is intellectually average. As a result, such
non-excusing handicaps are typically relegated to the domain of
mitigation.132
As with good-character facts, there is more than one plausible
explanation for why such handicaps favor reducing punishment.
Some explanations keep these handicaps firmly in the mitigation
camp. For example, the relative vulnerability or weakness of people
with these handicaps may elicit a compassionate desire to protect
them from suffering, and this compassionate response may alone
account for the inclination to reduce their punishment. Alternatively, in the case of diminished intelligence or serious mental
illness, the wrongdoers may have already suffered more than most
wrongdoers, and this might justify diminishing their punishment.
Suffering from non-excusing infancy may create a greater potential
to change in positive ways—i.e., to mature—so that the ratio of
costs to benefits favors reduced punishment.133 On any of these explanations, these handicaps favor reduced punishment for reasons
unrelated to responsibility and are, therefore, comfortably placed
in the mitigation category.
However, other explanations raise the possibility that such handicaps reduce the wrongdoer’s responsibility. After all, the most
serious versions of these handicaps entirely negate responsibility.
Profound mental illness, debilitating mental sub-normality, and
129. Berry, supra note 8, at 247 (“The youth of the offender in certain cases can mitigate
a retributive sentence based on a determination that a juvenile possesses a decreased level of
culpability”) (emphasis added).
130. See Morse, supra note 8, at 296 (“Lesser rationality or control problems . . . may be
considered only as a matter of discretion at sentencing.”); Johnston, supra note 8, at 152, n.21
(treating vulnerability to harm in prison due to mental illness not qualifying for insanity
defense as mitigating factor).
131. See DEMLEITNER, ET AL., supra note 87, at 335 (discussing mental impairment as factor
in sentencing).
132. Normally, this is left to the discretion of the sentencer, though the sentencing guidelines might also address it. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.13 (2005) (providing
for a downward departure at sentencing where the “defendant committed the offense while
suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity” under certain circumstances).
133. This does not seem true, however, for handicaps like non-excusing mental illness
and sub-normality, which seem as likely to heighten future dangerousness and immunity to
rehabilitation as to diminish them.
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early infancy all seriously impair capacities essential to responsibility
including basic cognitive and executive capacities. For these reasons, the law treats the extreme versions of these handicaps as
excuses. Thinking that less serious versions of these handicaps diminish responsibility too, even if they do not entirely negate it,
seems natural. Even if serious mental illness does not rise to the
level of legal insanity, it may still significantly impact the cognitive
and executive capacities associated with responsibility. The same
can be said of serious intellectual impairment that does not rise to
the level of legal sub-normality. Along similar lines, thinking that as
an infant moves from age five to age twenty-five, he becomes gradually more responsible, such that the fifteen year-old is more
responsible than the five year-old, but less responsible than the
twenty-five year-old, seems natural. Indeed, the alternative—that responsibility turns on like a light at some particular point on the
continuum from age five to age twenty-five—seems comparably
“grotesque.”134 Thus, it appears that such handicaps undercut capacities associated with responsibility. Even if they do not do so to
the extent necessary to qualify for a legal excuse, they still may
render the wrongdoer less responsible than a fully-capable
wrongdoer.135
As with good-character facts, then, there is more than one plausible explanation for why these partial handicaps favor reduced
punishment. On some explanations, these facts favor diminished
punishment for reasons unrelated to responsibility and thus appear
mitigating. On another, however, they undercut attribution of responsibility and look more like excusing facts.
As scholars have paid little attention to the nature of mitigation
or to the rationales for these particular mitigations, no consensus
exists to resolve this uncertainty. Nevertheless, the argument that
these facts favor reduced punishment because they have some excusing force seems quite powerful. These handicaps are closely
related to and exist on the same continuum as handicaps that fully
excuse, and they obviously impact capacities commonly associated
with responsibility. It is natural, then, to think that they favor reduced punishment in part because of their implications for the
responsibility of the wrongdoer. These may well be excuses in exile.
134. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 502 (1997).
135. The drafters of the Model Penal Code considered and rejected a diminished responsibility defense for mental illness and impairment. In so doing, however, they conceded that
adopting such a defense would “undoubtedly achieve[ ] a closer relation between criminal
liability and moral guilt” and that “diminished responsibility brings formal moral guilt more
closely into line with moral blameworthiness.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Comment to § 210.3 at 71–72 (1980).
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3. Non-Excusing Hard Circumstances
A similar dynamic emerges with certain hard circumstances136
that are typically treated as mitigations, but appear to be closely
related to excuses. For example, certain events are provoking but
do not qualify as adequate provocation under the law—“mere
words” (in a jurisdiction that does not recognize words alone as adequate provocation) or provocations that inflame the passions of
the offender but would not inflame the passions of an ordinary person. Another example is duress that does not satisfy the duress
doctrine, such as duress in a murder case, non-imminent duress, or
duress that would not cause a person of reasonable firmness to
yield. In each of these cases, circumstances closely related to fully or
partially excusing circumstances fail to trigger legal excuses. Although they do not justify a legal excuse, they may still favor some
reduction in punishment. Saying that a person who kills in response to a barrage of deeply insulting words or under intense
pressure from a coercive gangster should be punished less than one
who kills without such reasons does not seem strange.
As with good-character facts and partial handicaps, more than
one explanation is possible for why these hard circumstances favor
reduced punishment. One option is that sympathy for the wrongdoers in these cases, given the difficult situations and painful
emotions with which they have struggled, favors sparing them some
further suffering. Alternatively, perhaps they seem less likely to be
dangerous in the future than individuals who commit similar
crimes because they are unlikely to encounter such difficult circumstances again. If so, incapacitating or rehabilitating them is less
beneficial, favoring reduced punishment. These explanations support keeping such facts in the mitigation camp.
A more likely explanation is that these sorts of hard circumstances diminish the wrongdoer’s responsibility even if they do not
entirely negate it. After all, they closely resemble circumstances that
are normally excusing under the law. Such legally excusing circumstances may be excusing because they trigger emotions so intense
that they impair the cognitive and executive capacities necessary for
responsibility or another feature necessary for responsible action.
Perhaps they defeat responsibility because they create inducements
to crime so powerful that normal people cannot fairly be held responsible for yielding. Either way, something similar presumably
136. As used here, the term “hard circumstances” encompasses any circumstance that an
actor may experience as difficult and that plausibly makes wrongdoing more likely. Duress,
provocation, and deprivation are examples of such circumstances.
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happens with hard circumstances that do not meet the requirements of the existing legal excuse doctrines. A barrage of
profoundly insulting and hurtful words may not be adequate provocation under contemporary provocation doctrine, and a dangerous
gangster’s directive to commit murder may not meet the requirements of the duress doctrine, but both may well trigger intense
emotion or present a powerful inducement to wrongful behavior.
Given that the legally excusing hard circumstances significantly undercut responsibility, it makes sense to think that these nonqualifying hard circumstances diminish responsibility too. Even if
they do not qualify for a recognized legal excuse, they may render
the wrongdoer less responsible.
As with good-character facts and partial handicaps, there is more
than one plausible explanation for why these hard circumstances
favor reduced punishment. On some explanations, such circumstances favor diminished punishment for reasons unrelated to
responsibility and, therefore, are best categorized as mitigating
facts. On others, such circumstances undercut attribution of responsibility and are best categorized as excusing facts. As before,
there is no consensus resolving this uncertainty. Nevertheless, the
argument that these facts favor reduced punishment because they
have some excusing force is quite powerful. These hard circumstances are closely related to and exist on the same continuum as
hard circumstances that fully excuse. It is natural to think that they
favor reduced punishment because of what they imply about the
wrongdoer’s responsibility. Thus, these too may be excuses in exile.

4. Criminogenic Formative Influences
Consider again Fact B: “Throughout my childhood and into my
adolescent years, my father physically and sexually abused me, leaving me significantly more prone to violence than I would otherwise
have been.” Consider, more generally, criminogenic formative influences: a parent physically or sexually abused the wrongdoer, she
was raised in extreme deprivation and poverty, or corrupt role models or peer groups molded her. Theorists have observed that
learning about such influences inclines us to reduce punishment,137
137. Some have argued for embracing these inclinations. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 5
(seminal article arguing for “rotten social background” defense); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (1976). Others have acknowledged
these inclinations but argued against their full embrace. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 30, at
237–43; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 368–72. Still others have recognized these
inclinations but characterized them as misguided illusions. MOORE, supra note 134, 544.
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an inclination which increases the more we learn.138 Typically, such
facts are cast as mitigations, but it is possible these are actually excuses in exile too.
There has been extensive dispute about why criminogenic formative influences favor reduced punishment. Some characterize this
inclination as a mistaken impulse, an instinct gone awry.139 If this is
correct, then such facts are neither excusing nor mitigating. A
more common view is that sympathy for wrongdoers who have suffered drives the punishment-reduction intuition here.140 After all,
stories about criminogenic influences—especially those describing
abuse or deprivation—often highlight both the past vulnerability
and the past suffering of the wrongdoer and, thus, elicit protective
and compassionate feelings.141 A related idea is that such wrongdoers have already suffered more than their “fair share,” making it
gratuitous to inflict further suffering on them.142 Another suggestion is that we may lack standing to inflict punishment, perhaps
because we are implicated in social conditions or social inequities
that have disadvantaged the wrongdoer or pushed her to do
wrong.143 Although these explanations are quite diverse, they have
something important in common: they explain punishment-reduction intuitions about criminogenic formative influences without
reference to responsibility. They are consistent with the conventional view that such influences are no more than mitigating.
However, some commentators have argued that criminogenic
formative influences negate or diminish the wrongdoer’s responsibility.144 Especially where the wrongdoer was exposed to extreme
criminogenic formative influences at a time when he could not escape or mitigate them, treating the wrongdoer as no less
responsible than others never exposed to such influences may be
problematic. (This might be true, for example, where the offender
was the victim of long-term parental violence, starting in childhood). The most robust explanation for this is rooted in an
originationist account of responsibility, according to which actors
138. See WATSON, supra note 30, at 244; Anders Kaye, Powerful Particulars: The Real Reason
the Behavioral Sciences Threaten Criminal Responsibility, 37 FLA. ST. L. REV. 539 (2010).
139. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 134 548.
140. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 30, at 244–45; DRESSLER, supra note 6.
141. See WATSON, supra note 30, at 237–43.
142. See MOORE, supra note 134, at 545 (noting that we may be inclined to excuse “disadvantaged” defendants due to “our sense that those who became criminals because of adverse
circumstances have ‘already suffered enough’ ”).
143. For one discussion of this “standing” problem, see Delgado, supra note 5, at 68.
144. See Delgado, supra note 5; Bazelon, supra note 137; Kaye, supra note 104. See also
Warner, supra note 25, at 127 (suggesting that “social and economic deprivation and disadvantage affects an offender’s culpability”).
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should not be held responsible for acts that forces and circumstances beyond their control caused.145 The originationist intuition
has been the subject of persistent debate in the philosophy of responsibility.146 It is sometimes expressed (more or less precisely) as
the requirement that actors must have “true” or “contra-causal” free
will to be held responsible for their acts.147 More recently, it has also
been associated with the view that responsibility attribution is not
justifiable where luck plays a significant role in the acts for which
people are held responsible.148 Evidence that a wrongdoer’s act can
be traced in a significant way to criminogenic formative influences
raises serious questions about whether the wrongdoer originated
his wrongful act in the way necessary for him to be held responsible. It is possible, then, that criminogenic formative influences
favor diminished punishment because they call into question the
wrongdoer’s responsibility. On this view, criminogenic formative influences are excusing.
As with the other categories of possible exiled excuses above,
then, there is more than one plausible way to explain why criminogenic formative influences favor reduced punishment. On some
explanations, these influences favor diminished punishment for
reasons unrelated to responsibility and are, therefore, best categorized as mitigating facts. On others, they undercut attribution of
responsibility and are best categorized as excusing facts. As before,
no consensus exists to resolve this uncertainty. Nevertheless, the argument that these facts favor reduced punishment because they
have some excusing force is a live one. Thus, while criminogenic
formative influences are normally treated as (no more than) mitigations, they may actually be excuses in exile.
*****
Thus, assessing the conventional taxonomy of excuse and mitigation through the lens of the schema in Part III, it appears that
several categories of potentially mitigating facts may be misclassified. For each category, there are competing explanations for why
such facts favor reduced punishment. Some say nothing about the
wrongdoer’s responsibility and thus support treating these facts as
mitigations. Others, however, suggest such facts diminish the
145.
146.
147.
148.

Kaye, supra note 104, 403–05.
Id. at 371–74.
For a fuller discussion of the development of the originationist view, see id.
See, e.g., NEIL LEVY, HARD LUCK: HOW LUCK UNDERMINES FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1–2 (2011).
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wrongdoer’s responsibility. These explanations favor treating these
facts as excusing. Treating them as mitigating miscategorizes them.
Such miscategorization has serious consequences. The law treats
excuses far more carefully than it treats mitigations. Miscategorizing an excuse as a mitigation relegates that excuse to a
marginalized, second-class status, one where it is rendered comparably invisible and treated in a comparably careless and unreliable
way. For an excuse, then, relegation to the domain of mitigation is a
kind of exile.149

V. EXPLAINING

THE

EXILES

Suppose that some potentially excusing facts are exiled to the
domain of mitigation. Why does this happen? This Part reviews
some possible answers, beginning with some plausible pragmatic
explanations and then highlighting that anxieties about excuse
doctrines and their implications for comfortable and cherished visions of the criminal law and society more broadly may play an
important role here too.

A. The Exiles are Not Really Excusing
One way to defuse the exiled excuse problem is to say that the
exiled excuses are not really excuses at all. After all, if they are not
excuses, there is nothing noteworthy about relegating them to the
domain of mitigation.
An argument that the exiled excuses are not really excuses at all
might draw on theories of or intuitions about responsibility to show
that these alleged excuses have no bearing on responsibility. This
seems entirely plausible with respect to good-character facts. The
argument that good-character facts are excusing is rooted in character or identification theories of responsibility, but many
responsibility theorists reject character and identification theories
149. Stephen Morse makes a related point in his argument for a generic partial excuse
for diminished responsibility due to mental impairment. Morse, supra note 8, at 298–99 (“Although partial responsibility can in principle be fully considered at sentencing, this method
suffers from substantial defects. First and most important, sentencing is a matter of discretion. Judges may refuse to give reduced rationality its just mitigating force, and there may be
wide disparities [from judge to judge]. . . . [N]either current doctrines nor sentencing practices can guarantee generally principled, equal consideration of mitigating factors in most
cases.”).
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in favor of theories that tie responsibility to choice, capacity, or attitude.150 Moreover, as previously discussed, it is not hard to come up
with responsibility-independent reasons why good-character facts
favor reduced punishment.
Similarly, there are readily available arguments that criminogenic
formative influences have no bearing on responsibility. The most
straightforward argument that such influences bear on responsibility is rooted in an originationist account of responsibility, and there
are long-standing and robust alternatives to originationism in the
philosophy of responsibility. In addition, as discussed above, it is
not hard to come up with responsibility-independent reasons for
the punishment reducing tendencies of criminogenic formative
influences.
This is not to say that these arguments regarding good-character
facts and criminogenic formative influences are obviously correct.
Indeed, there may be very strong reasons to think that responsibility requires origination151 and that evidence of criminogenic
formative influences commonly trigger the intuition that the
wrongdoer is not as responsible as he first appeared to be, especially where that evidence is particularized and voluminous.152
Nevertheless, resources are available for arguing that good-character and criminogenic formative influences are merely mitigating.
Whether or not good-character facts and criminogenic formative
influences are plausibly relegated to the domain of mitigation, partial handicaps and hard circumstances are not so easy to dismiss.
Both these sorts of facts are very similar to and on the same continuum as facts that uncontroversially excuse. In some cases, the
distinctions between these facts and their uncontroversially excusing brethren are whisper thin. Thus, making a plausible argument
that these partial handicaps and hard circumstances favor reduced
punishment for reasons unrelated to diminished responsibility is
difficult.
This Article does not propose to resolve whether any of these
potentially exiled excuses are really excuses. Rather, it raises the possibility that these are excuses in exile in order to explore more fully
150. Seminal statements emphasizing choice or capacity include H.L.A. HART, PUNISHRESPONSIBILITY 28–53 (1968) and MOORE, supra note 134, 548–92. Peter Westen
suggests an attitude-oriented conception. Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory of Excuse, 25
LAW & PHIL. 289 (2006).
151. Kaye, supra note 104.
152. See, e.g., Lovegrove, supra note 9, at 204 (noting that subjects appear much more
likely to find facts mitigating when presented in detailed case-studies than when presented in
abstract form). See also Kaye, supra note 138 (contending that detailed narratives are more
likely to elicit excusing intuitions than abstractly described facts).
MENT AND
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some of the reasons why some excuses are treated as mitigations,
and thus to discover new truths about the relationship between excuse and mitigation.

B. The Exiles are Too Hard to Formally Conceptualize
One potential explanation for exiling some excuses is ostensibly
pragmatic: some excuses are too difficult to formally conceptualize
and, thus, too difficult to operationalize in the law.
On this view, some potential excuses are more difficult to conceptualize than others, and, at a certain level of difficulty, excuses
become too difficult to operationalize. That is, it becomes too difficult to provide a short, elemental definition of the excuse that
adequately identifies the excusing facts or circumstances in terms
conducive to proof at trial without being under- or over-inclusive.
In such cases, the law does not offer an excuse, but it does not entirely ignore these important facts or circumstances either. Instead,
it resorts to a second-best solution, shunting such excuses to a domain where formal conceptualization is not required, where short,
elemental definitions are not necessary, and where open-ended, intuitive, case-by-case assessments are sufficient—the domain of
mitigation. While this move does not do full justice to the excusing
nature of the facts at issue, it does allow those facts to play a meaningful role in the wrongdoer’s case.
This story seems entirely plausible in the case of good-character
facts. It may be difficult, for example, to provide criteria for assessing the goodness of others’ character or to provide such criteria in
the form of a short, elemental definition conducive to proof at trial.
After all, many different things might suggest that a person has
good character—for example, a clean record, community service,
good or heroic deeds, or honorable service in the military, on the
police force, or in the clergy. Constructing such a list highlights
several challenges. The list is woefully incomplete, and many other
things might provide evidence of good character. At the same time,
the listed items are far from dispositive of good character. A person
with a clean record may be an awful person, people who do good
deeds often also do horrible deeds, and honorable military service
is perfectly compatible with corrupt character. These problems reflect something fundamental about potential good-character facts:
character assessments are exceedingly complex. They take into account and weigh a multitude of facts about a person. As a result,
these judgments are made intuitively rather than formulaically. It is
unsurprising, then, that generating a formulaic definition for use in
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the criminal law is difficult. These look like just the sorts of facts
that fit the realm of mitigation, where nothing is formulized or
mandatory, and everything is left to subjective, case-by-case
judgments.
Similar problems arise in trying to formulate an excuse for criminogenic formative influences. One fundamental problem is that it
is difficult to determine which formative influences are criminogenic. Many people intuit that growing up in poverty is
criminogenic, but empirical research sometimes raises questions
about this intuition and many people who grow up in poverty do
not commit crimes.153 Even putting aside these problems, defining
poverty and the degree of exposure necessary is difficult. Likewise,
it is commonly thought that physical or sexual abuse during childhood are criminogenic influences, but it is also well-known that
most victims of such abuse do not go on to engage in criminal behavior.154 Even putting aside this problem as well, defining abuse
and the extent of abuse required to constitute an excuse is daunting. The ways in which formative experiences lead to criminal
behavior are still unclear.
Without knowing which facts are criminogenic, developing a definition identifying such facts is impossible. Moreover, even if
criminogenic facts were identifiable, reducing those facts to short,
elemental definitions may pose insurmountable problems. Suppose
that parental physical abuse can be criminogenic. Presumably, this
depends in part on the intensity, frequency, duration, and tenor of
the abuse, but quantifying these variables within a definition for an
excuse would be difficult. In short, even if we adopt the view that
criminogenic formative influences should be excusing, operationalizing such an excuse appears very difficult. Again, it seems much
easier to relegate these considerations to the unstructured realm of

153. See, e.g., David P. Farrington, Longitudinal and Experimental Research in Criminology, 42
CRIME & JUST. 453 (2013) (“Most studies . . . have reported that neighborhood and community factors have only indirect influences on offending through their influence on family
factors.”).
154. See Cathy Spatz Widom, The Cycle of Violence, 244 SCIENCE 160 (1989) (“These findings
indicate that abused and neglected children have significantly greater risk of becoming delinquents, criminals, and violent criminals. These findings do not show, however, that every
abused or neglected child will become delinquent, criminal, or a violent criminal . . . . Although early child abuse and neglect place one at increased risk for official recorded
delinquency, adult criminality, and violent criminal behavior, a large portion of abused or
neglected children do not succumb”).
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mitigation, where the sentencer can judge the plausibility and significance of any alleged criminogenic formative influence in a
holistic, open-ended way.155
Presumably these problems are not as pressing with the other
exiles: partial handicaps and hard circumstances. These potential
excuses are very closely related to established excuses. Since those
established excuses already have conventional definitions, appropriately modifying those definitions to identify the relevant excusing
facts and circumstances should not be too difficult. But, even here,
problems persist. These excusing facts exist on continua. The relevant handicaps, for example, run from the barely perceptible to the
catastrophic. It seems implausible that the law should treat any such
handicap, no matter how trivial, as excusing. The established excuses have the virtue of using concrete criteria to mark off a region
of the continuum in which these facts have undeniable excusing
force. Turning to other regions of the continuum, it is not obvious
that conveniently articulable criteria exist to mark other regions as
clearly as the existing excuses. There is a real danger of sliding
down a slippery slope. Perhaps it is better to leave these murky issues to the subjective, intuitive processes of the sentencing phase.
Thus, it may be that potentially excusing facts are exiled to the
realm of mitigation because they do not fit the conventions of excuse. They are not susceptible to short, elemental definitions that
satisfactorily capture the range of facts and circumstances that have
excusing significance. Perhaps the best option is to handle these
potentially excusing facts with the tools used for mitigations.

C. It is Too Difficult to Calibrate The Exiles’ Excusing Value
Another ostensibly pragmatic explanation echoes the first: some
excuses have such variable and nuanced impact on responsibility
that constructing a formal framework that properly tracks their excusing impact is too difficult. Thus, they are relegated to the
domain of mitigation because capturing their variability in the
terms of excuse is difficult.
The account offered here assumes responsibility is scalar, existing on a continuum, and not something that turns on and off like
a light. Some facts entirely negate responsibility, but others only
155. Kahan and Nussbaum suggest something like this reasoning in their argument that
evidence about influences about character formation should not be considered during the
guilt phase but should be considered during the sentencing phase. Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 29, at 369.
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diminish it. It follows that excuse is scalar too. In some cases the
wrongdoer is completely excused. In others, responsibility is not entirely defeated, and the wrongdoer need not be entirely excused. In
these cases, partial excuses might make sense, and the criminal law
has made some forays in this direction, as in the doctrines of provocation, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, diminished
capacity (in its diminished responsibility form),156 imperfect duress,
and imperfect self-defense, and perhaps also in doctrines recognizing that certain impairments might “negate” specific intent (leaving
the defendant convictable for a lesser general intent offense) like
voluntary intoxication and the mens rea version of the diminished
capacity defense.157
Even so, tracking scalar excuses presents a challenge for the law.
In order to do justice to scalar excuse, it might seem that the law
should provide fully scalable excuses. Current doctrines do not do
this, and doing so might not be possible. The law only provides for
full excuses and a handful of partial excuses, and the partial excuses are far from fully scaled. Rather than providing different legal
consequences for many different levels of responsibility, they recognize only one diminished level of responsibility, perhaps crudely
characterized as three-quarters responsibility.158 This obviously
leaves most of the continuum of possible excuse unrecognized in
formal law.
Perhaps this makes sense. Perhaps it is simply too difficult to construct a framework for fully recognizing scalar excuse in the
criminal law. Articulating the criteria for distinguishing multiple
different degrees of excuse would be an enormous task. Suppose
that different degrees of youth diminish responsibility to differing
degrees. The law would have to provide criteria distinguishing the
cases where youth reduces responsibility by thirty percent from
those where it reduces responsibility by thirty-five percent. Furthermore, it is unlikely that fact finders would be able to apply such
criteria reliably. For example, juries would likely find it difficult to
reliably distinguish diminished capacity that reduces responsibility
156. DRESSLER, supra note 6, at § 26.03.
157. For an illustration of the partial defense reading of the voluntary intoxication defense, see DRESSLER, supra note 6, at § 26.02[B][3] (noting that some jurisdictions treat
voluntary intoxication and abnormal mental conditions as lack of capacity defenses, which, as
a practical matter, makes them only partial defenses, since they negate the mens rea for
specific intent crimes, but there will almost always be a general intent crime to which neither
is a defense).
158. They suggest existing partial excuses like provocation, diminished responsibility, and
imperfect duress—formally manifested by knocking murder down to manslaughter—appear
calibrated to a one-quarter reduction in the responsibility of the wrongdoer. This, obviously,
only very crudely estimates what the reduction from murder to manslaughter suggests.
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thirty percent from diminished capacity that reduces it thirty-five
percent. Better, then, that the law paints in broad strokes and eschews efforts at fine-grained tracking of excuse.
This reasoning may seem more pertinent to some excuses than
others. For example, some excusing facts are unlikely to fully excuse and unlikely even to rise to the level of the three-quarters
excuses described above. In a broad-strokes regime, not recognizing such excuses at all may make more sense.
Perhaps this explains some of the exiled excuses. Perhaps goodcharacter excuses, partial handicaps, difficult circumstances, or
criminogenic formative influences will never rise to the complete or
three-quarters level and will always lurk in the lower regions of the
excuse continuum. Maybe the precise weight of such excuses will
always be impossible to nail down given the multitude and diversity
of facts that bear on them. If so, it might not be worth it to develop
a framework formally recognizing such inevitably scalar and relatively minor excuses in the law, and it might make more sense to
relegate excuses like these to the subjective, intuitive, and discretionary realm of mitigation.

D. The Exiles are the Unbalanced Remainders in
the Regime of Punishment
While these ostensibly pragmatic explanations may have some
value, another sort of explanation is possible: some excuses are exiled to the domain of mitigation out of a deep anxiety about
excuses and the danger that they will overwhelm criminal liability
and undermine or transform our system of criminal justice. Some
potential excuses may seem to threaten to overflow the preferred
limits of excuse, extending excuse to too many or to the wrong offenders. Conflicted about such inconvenient and unwanted
excuses—torn between their importance to criminal justice and
their threat to comfortable and cherished visions of how such justice should be administered—we exile them to invisibility and
anarchy in the realm of mitigation,159 intolerable conflicts banished
to the criminal law’s unconscious.
159. For a similar observation, see SANFORD H. KADISH, STEVEN J. SCHULHOFER, & CAROL S.
STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, 911 (8th ed., 2007) (“In practical effect, the
Model Penal Code leaves sentencing judges to decide what significance, if any, to attach to
mental illness that neither establishes a defense of insanity nor negates a mens rea element of
the offense . . . This reliance on sentencing discretion is a frequent move made by those who
want to take account of diminished capacity without expanding excuse defenses.”).
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The discussion above has already suggested that some excuses
are exiled to mitigation because they are hard to cabin. The pragmatic concern about the difficulty in creating functional definitions
for some excuses raises the possibility that trying will lead to overbroad excuse. Likewise, the pragmatic concern about identifying
the right stopping points for excusing conditions and circumstances that exist on continua raises the possibility of stopping too
late. Together, these possibilities suggest caution in order to avoid
excusing more broadly than desired.
There is another way in which excuses may present inconvenience. Even when properly defined, they may still apply to too
many offenders. Good-character excuses might present this problem. If many bad acts are “out of character,” then good-character
excuses may excuse more offenders than is desirable. This problem
seems even more pressing with respect to criminogenic formative
influences. Many, perhaps even most, offenders can point to such
influences in their lives. A great many were raised in poverty, many
violent offenders were victims of parental abuse, and many young
violent offenders act under pressure from or because of the corrupting influence of violent role models, peers, or communities. If
criminogenic formative influence has standing as an excuse, it may
excuse many more offenders than we are comfortable excusing.
One response to this threat is to clamp down on excuse, forcefully limiting its reach and assuring it does not sweep too broadly. If
partial handicaps are too hard to cabin, deny that they are excusing. If criminogenic formative influences will be present in too
many cases, hold that they are not excusing.
Of course, stripping excuses of their significance might produce
dissonance. If many people intuit that a fact is excusing, but the law
refuses to treat it as such, the law may seem to diverge too much
from widespread moral intuitions and, thus, appear unfair. The result is a conflict between the importance of these excuses to justice
and the threat they pose to the criminal justice system.
Relegating such inconvenient excuses to the domain of mitigation helps pacify such potential dissonance. By characterizing these
facts as mitigating, the law symbolically signals that it is not ignoring
these considerations, and, thus, that justice can still be achieved. Of
course, once they have been relegated to the domain of mitigation,
these considerations are likely to be treated in a much sloppier and
less regulated way. In an important sense, they will become invisible, easily overlooked, and completely at the mercy of unfettered
discretion. Symbolically, though, the law maintains a formal place
for these excusing facts in assessing wrongdoers and, thus, abates
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the dissonance that entirely rejecting these potential excuses might
generate.
Criminal law scholarship and ethical theory are peppered with
examples that seem to fit this picture. James Stephen, fearing that
recognizing duress as an excuse was a dangerous extension of the
defenses, sought to accommodate duress in mitigation: “Compulsion by threats ought in no case whatever to be admitted as an
excuse for crime, though it may and ought to operate in mitigation
of punishment in most, though not all, cases.”160 The Model Penal
Code’s drafters recognized that partial handicaps bore directly on
individual responsibility but saw danger in expanding the defenses
to recognize this: “The most that it is feasible to do with lesser disabilities,” they concluded, “is to accord them proper weight in
sentencing.”161 R. Jay Wallace, in his seminal work on responsibility,
acknowledges that serious childhood deprivation may diminish an
adult’s responsibility but maintains that “we may not wish to exempt
such people . . . from accountability and for legal purposes there
may be good reason to punish them for their crimes much as we
would fully accountable offenders.”162 As for the “social and developmental circumstances” that diminish their responsibility, these
should be “mitigating factors” in our moral assessments of the actors.163 Kahan and Nussbaum, arguing that the criminal law should
hold wrongdoers responsible for their emotions, acknowledge that
wrongdoers are not always responsible for their characters and that
it may be unjust to punish them as though they were.164 Instead of
taking account of this injustice during guilt determinations, they
suggest doing so through “the practice of mercy in sentencing of
offenders who cannot justly be held responsible.”165 In each of
these cases, the authors nod at the intuition that the circumstance
or condition at issue bears on responsibility and thus on justice but
conclude that some other consideration favors relegating the issue
to the domain of mitigation. Doing full justice to these excusing
facts, they suggest, expands excuse too far.
There is good reason to think that the excusing doctrines reflect
anxiety about overbroad excuse and a commitment to keeping excuses rare.166 The evidence is visible throughout the literature on
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 108 (1883).
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 2.09 cmt. 2, (1980).
WALLACE, supra note 114, at 233.
Id.
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, 366–72.
Id. at 275.
See generally Kaye, supra note 104.
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responsibility and excuse.167 Theorists worry, for example, that
properly tailoring excuse to responsibility will eviscerate the criminal law: “if we do that job right will there be anyone left to
blame?”168 This possibility provokes intense dismay—it is “pernicious and debilitating,”169 “disturbing,”170 “distressing,”171
“startling,”172 “troubling,”173 “perilous,”174 and even “tragic.”175 In
the same anxious vein, proponents of expanded excuse are portrayed as threatening, making “lifelong effort[s] to expand the
categories of those who should be excused,”176 scheming to “free
the maximal number of defendants.”177 In response to these threats
of overbroad excuse, theorists often explicitly embrace the project
of corralling excuse.178 Daniel Dennett looks for “some elbow room
for . . . sinners in between the saints [who never do wrong] and the
monsters [whom we must excuse].”179 Michael Moore argues “there
is . . . no good reason to fear” that there is a “general moral excuse.”180 Fischer and Ravizza are committed to “protecting our moral
responsibility” from the overbroad excuse suggested by determinist
ideas.181
167. Id.
168. DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM 99 (1984); see id. at 157 (“[S]ince we are all more
or less imperfect, will there be anyone left to be responsible after we have excused all those
with good excuses?”); see also P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 117, 117
(Derk Pereboom ed., 1997) (observing “that if [determinism] is true, then concepts of moral
obligation and responsibility really have no application and the practices of punishing and
blaming, of expressing moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified”?); id. at 120
(finding some believe that “just punishment . . . impl[ies] moral guilt and guilt implies moral
responsibility and moral responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of
determinism”); FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 105, at 28 (noting that the possibility that
originationism and determinism are both true leaves us “not clear that we can legitimately
hold each other morally responsible for our behavior.”); MOORE, supra note 134, at 504 (arguing that if determinism and originationism are true, “it is hard to see why everyone is not
excused for all actions”).
169. MOORE, supra note 134, at 490–91.
170. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 105, at 17.
171. Id. at 28.
172. Id.
173. WALLACE, supra note 114, at 3.
174. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959,
960 (1992) (“concessions to determinism are as inevitable as they are perilous”).
175. MOORE, supra note 134, at 244. See also SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 12,
26 (1990) (warning of “drastic” and “highly undesirable” implications of expansive excuse).
176. Moore, supra note 134, at 916.
177. Id. There are other passages in Moore that give the impression of responsibility being eaten away, too. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 134, at 242–43 (using thought experiments
about moral luck to illustrate how responsibility is consumed piece by piece).
178. Kaye, supra note 104, at 35–68.
179. DENNETT, supra note 168, at 157. See also Strawson, supra note 168, at 122 (arguing
that we need not be pessimistic about blaming wrongdoers).
180. MOORE, supra note 134, at 547 (1997).
181. FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 105, at 54 (emphasis added).
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This discomfort about the prospect of overbroad excuse likely
has multiple roots. In the current regime, most offenders are punished. Perhaps upending this familiar and comfortable regime
creates anxiety. Anxiety about crime is a persistent feature of our
political culture. Perhaps overbroad excuse will prevent effective
management and prevention of crime, since overbroad excuse
steals away opportunities to incapacitate or rehabilitate offenders,
or to send deterrent or morally influential messages to prospective
criminals, thereby squandering opportunities to reduce crime.182
Beyond these possibilities, there may be less savory motives for
cabining excuse, including root political motives. A philosophical
position favoring narrower excuse
residence in the criminal law. On the contrary . . . [it] is a nice
fit for a particular vision of the state—one in which the state is
static and striated. Such a criminal law disrupts popular scrutiny of the relationship between social conditions and crime,
and thus makes it less likely that the suffering and costs inherent in the crime problem will lead us to criticize or challenge
the existing status quo; and it gives the state extra leeway to
use its coercive power against the disadvantaged—the very
class with the most incentive to challenge the status quo. In
short, [a] criminal law [that takes this position] contributes to
the calcification of a hierarchical social order . . . .183
Some excuses, then, seem inconvenient. They threaten to overflow the boundaries of excuse, to extend excuse too broadly, to let
too many offenders off the hook, and thus to subvert the administration of criminal justice. They undercut a familiar regime, impair
crime control efforts, and threaten preferred social and political
arrangements. This is the problem of the “unbalanced remainder”:
excuses that do not fit the preferred vision of excuse threaten to
disrupt or bring down the criminal justice system. Exiling difficultto-cabin and widely-applicable excuses to the domain of mitigation
182. The drafters of the Model Penal Code alluded to such concerns in rejecting some
potential expansions of the excuse doctrines. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §210.3 at 71-72 (1980) (rejecting a broad diminished responsibility excuse for offenders
suffering lesser mental incapacities in part because such an excuse would come “at the cost of
driving a wedge between dangerousness and social control” and “undercuts the social purpose of condemnation.”) See also Clarence Thomas, Crime and Punishment—And Personal
Responsibility, NAT’L TIMES (Sept. 1994), at 31, quoted in KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra
note 159, at 929 (“An effective criminal justice system—one that holds people accountable
for harmful conduct—simply cannot be sustained under conditions where there are boundless excuses for violent behavior and no moral authority for the state to punish.”).
183. Kaye, supra note 104.

WINTER 2015]

Excuses in Exile

493

avoids this unwanted result. It strips these unbalanced remainders
of their threatening excusing status and relegates them to a place
where they can do little harm, while at the same time minimizing
the dissonance that refusing to credit a valid excuse would normally
provoke.
In this sense, then, the domain of mitigation serves as the unconscious of the criminal law. It is a mechanism for managing deep
conflicts in our thinking about criminal justice, a place to bury intuitions and insights about the nature and sources of criminality that
threaten favored visions of how criminal justice should work.
*****
Excuses may be exiled to the realm of mitigation for a number of
different reasons, then. They are hard to formally conceptualize,
they are hard to calibrate, and they threaten to excuse too broadly.
To the extent that these are purely pragmatic reasons for exiling
excuses, they are plausible explanations.
But are they adequate? There is much at stake in the law of excuse. Excuses play an essential role in assuring that the criminal law
does justice by giving wrongdoers what they deserve. When the law
fails to credit an individual’s excuse, it inflicts undeserved punishment and, thus, undercuts the justness of that punishment. To the
extent that justice is an important value in the criminal law, this is
disturbing. Its potential impact on the perceived legitimacy of the
criminal justice system is also concerning. If citizens perceive that
the state inflicts punishment unjustly and without recognizing valid
excuses, they are likely to question the consonance between their
own values and the values driving criminal justice. Their respect for
and deference to the criminal law may diminish accordingly. Our
commitments to justice and legitimacy in criminal justice may require us to grapple more effectively with these inconveniences.
To the extent that these are not just pragmatic reasons but manifestations of visceral anxiety about excusing too broadly, they seem
particularly unsavory. Brute anxiety is a poor justification for failing
to recognize excuses and accurately tally desert. In the short term,
this failure undercuts justice. In the longer term, such unaddressed
pathologies will spawn more problems. It would be better to repatriate the exiled excuses and bring these buried conflicts back into the
consciousness of the criminal law. The next Part takes up this challenge and considers whether there are workable solutions to the
exile problem.
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There are several different possible solutions to the problem of
exiled excuses. Two involve making room for the exiled excuses in
the realm of excuse. The first of these is a large-scale, perpetual
revisionary project that recasts the exiled excuses as formal, legally
recognized excuses. The second seeks to accomplish something
similar in a simpler way, by developing generic excuses that might
accommodate the exiles. A third solution flips reform on its head.
Instead of reinstating the exiled excuses, it makes the realm of mitigation a better place for them by assuring that the mitigations are
treated with more care and rigor.

A. Wholesale Revision
The most obvious way to repatriate the exiled excuses is to fashion formal legal excuses for each of them. On this approach, one
excuse or set of excuses is necessary for cases that involve goodcharacter facts, another for partial-handicap cases, and so on. Fashioning these formal legal excuses would require labeling and
cataloging them as excuses and generating short, elemental definitions for each of the conditions or circumstances deemed excusing.
A mechanism for assuring that the consequences for the defendant
accurately track the excusing value of the excuse at issue (complete
or partial) would also be needed. With this formal structure in
place, parties would litigate these excuses during the guilt phase of
the trial, their application would be mandatory rather than discretionary, and the same procedural safeguards would protect them as
protect traditional excuses.
Of course, this would be an enormous project, which would involve working out and articulating definitions for a large number of
different excuses. The discussion above identified four broad categories, but drafting workable definitions might require several
different excuses within each category. Moreover, this process
might uncover additional exiled excuses or conditions and circumstances not currently treated as either excuses or mitigations to add
to the list of excuses. Additionally, grappling with the pragmatic
challenges described in the previous Part would be necessary to reduce complex, murky excusing conditions and circumstances to
short, elemental definitions and to translate scalar excuses into formal law. To say the least, these are daunting tasks.
This is not to say it cannot be done. Workable legal definitions
exist for other complex, murky excusing conditions (like insanity
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and provocation), for other obviously scalar excusing conditions
(like infancy), and for some excusing circumstances (like duress
and entrapment). The same may be possible for the exiled excuses.
Nevertheless recognizing the enormity of the task, considering
other options would be prudent.

B. Generic Excuse and Generic Partial Excuse
A more pragmatic and manageable alternative is to develop a generic or catch-all mechanism to accommodate known exiled
excuses and any other potential exiled excuses.184
This approach would not specify the precise conditions and circumstances constituting the unrecognized excuses. Instead, it
would adopt a simple and flexible doctrine of excuse and partial
excuse that would reach all appropriate cases—that is, all cases in
which some condition or circumstance diminishes the wrongdoer’s
responsibility. This doctrine could accommodate potential complete excuses by modifying the relevant language from this Article’s
schema for excuse and mitigation:
A person has a complete excuse where conditions or circumstances negate her responsibility in that they either (i) entirely
eliminate responsibility or a prerequisite necessary for responsibility or (ii) reduce such a prerequisite so that it does not
meet the minimum threshold for responsibility.
In litigating this generic complete excuse, a defendant would offer evidence and articulate her claim regarding any condition or
circumstance in her case plausibly negating her responsibility. The
fact finder would assess that evidence by considering whether (i)
the evidence established the claimed condition or circumstance,
(ii) the claimed condition or circumstance was the sort that might
negate responsibility, and (iii) the claimed condition or circumstance actually did negate responsibility in this defendant’s case.

184. Stephen Morse has also proposed the adoption of a generic partial excuse, but his
proposed excuse is considerably narrower than the one proposed here. See Morse, supra note
8, at 299–300. His proposal would apply only in cases where the diminished capacity for
rational thought impaired responsibility.
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This generic approach would also have to accommodate potential partial excuses.185 Again, this could be done by modifying
language from the schema for excuse and mitigation:
A person has a partial excuse where conditions or circumstances reduce the extent to which that person is responsible
or to which a prerequisite for responsibility is present (but not
to the degree necessary to negate responsibility).
Here, a defendant would offer evidence regarding any condition or
circumstance in her case plausibly diminishing her responsibility
and articulate her claim that the condition or circumstance actually
did diminish her responsibility. The finder of fact would assess that
evidence by considering whether (i) the evidence established the
claimed condition or circumstance, (ii) the claimed condition or
circumstance was the sort that might diminish responsibility, and
(iii) the claimed condition or circumstance actually diminished responsibility in this defendant’s case.
The partial excuse doctrine would presumably require a mechanism for assuring that the consequences for the defendant properly
reflect the partial excuse. Since the excuse is only partial, it should
not be a complete defense to criminal liability. Instead, it should
function similarly to other partial excuse doctrines—it should diminish liability and punishment in proportion to the wrongdoer’s
responsibility.
However, while having a mechanism for fully scalar consequences would be ideal, it would be difficult to achieve.186 Even so,
there would be value in a less perfectly scalar mechanism. Thus, for
example, the fact finder might grade the partial excuse as “greater”
or “lesser”:
A person has a greater partial excuse if the conditions or circumstances reducing that person’s responsibility have a great
185. The proposed partial excuse is different in an important sense from the diminished
responsibility doctrines some American case law and the German Criminal Code have recognized and from Stephen Morse’s proposal to recognize a verdict of “guilty but partially
responsible.” (For a survey of these examples, see KADISH, SCHULHOFER, & STEIKER, supra note
159, at 910). The important difference is that each of these actual or proposed doctrines
limits the potential partial excuse to cases in which the defendant suffers from a mental
illness or mental abnormality.
186. See Morse, supra note 8, at 300, 301–02, 304 (2003) (arguing that less-than-substantial impairments need not excuse, even partially, that the system lacks the ability to make
fine-grained assessments of responsibility, and that a more scalar approach might lead to
“confusion and arbitrary decisions”).
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impact on the actor’s responsibility but do not completely negate her responsibility.
A person has a lesser partial excuse if the conditions or circumstances reducing that person’s responsibility have a lesser
impact on the actor’s responsibility, so long as they have a sufficient impact on her responsibility to warrant a reduction in
criminal liability.
These grades, in turn, might diminish the consequences for the
defendant in some mandatory fashion. For example, a greater excuse might reduce the level of an offender’s felony by two classes or
degrees, and the lesser excuse might reduce the level of an offender’s felony by one class or degree. Alternatively, a greater
excuse might reduce the maximum and minimum legally authorized punishments by fifty percent187 while the lesser excuse might
reduce the maximum and minimum legally authorized punishments by twenty-five percent.
As with the wholesale revision discussed in Part VI.A, the adoption of this formal framework would mean that the parties would
litigate these excuses during the guilt phase of the trial, their application would be mandatory rather than discretionary, and the same
procedural safeguards would protect these excuses as protect traditional excuses.
Of course, adopting these generic complete and partial excuses
entails various potential problems. One pressing concern is that
such doctrines would give fact finders tremendous discretion over
excuses. The generic definitions above neither mandate that factfinders identify particular conditions as excusing nor prohibit them
from doing so. As a result, there could be enormous variation from
jury to jury and from case to case with respect to whether particular
conditions or circumstances are treated as excusing. Moreover, this
leeway could become a vehicle for bias and discrimination. Given
this leeway, it would not be surprising to see that certain conditions
excused more often in cases involving privileged defendants than in
those involving disadvantaged defendants. Similar inconsistency
and bias already arises in the application of mitigations, and the
generic excuse and partial excuse doctrines might run the same
risk.188
187. See id. at 303 (arguing that a partial excuse should decrease the maximum and minimum punishments, but that the percentage of the decrease should depend on the
seriousness of the crime, not on the degree of the excuse).
188. Morse discusses and rejects (on grounds that may not be fully applicable to this
proposal) some other possible objections to his proposed generic partial excuse, including
that (i) adoption of a generic partial excuse might invite “trumped up claims and weak or
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Although these are potentially serious problems, they are less serious here than with mitigations because important safeguards
apply, and would continue to apply, to the litigation of excuses that
do not apply to the litigation of mitigations. Thus, even if these
generic excuse doctrines risk inconsistency and bias, they would not
pose as great a risk of inconsistency and bias as the current mechanism for handling exiled excuses.

C. Taking Mitigation More Seriously
The first two solutions this Article proposes would require significant reform in the law of excuse. A third approach flips reform on
its head. Instead of reinstating the exiled excuses, it makes the
realm of mitigation a better place for exiled excuses, augmenting
the care and rigor with which responsibility-related mitigations are
processed.
Such a reform could be accomplished in a variety of ways. For
example, it could formally conceptualize each of the responsibilityrelated mitigations to catalog, label, and define them. (Presumably,
it would also retain a generic, catch-all standard to accommodate
less frequently litigated or newly recognized responsibility-related
mitigations). It could also diminish sentencer discretion regarding
such mitigations by requiring sentencers to give mitigating weight
to certain responsibility-related mitigations or by specifying that certain responsibility-related mitigations should have specified impacts
on sentence. It might also apply some or all of the safeguards currently reserved for trial to the litigation of responsibility-related
mitigations as well.
Taking steps like these would have a twofold benefit. First, it
would ensure that, conceptually and procedurally, responsibility-related mitigations are treated more like excuses such that these
mitigations are assured more careful and rigorous investigation, articulation, and assessment. Second, it would signal the elevated
standing of responsibility-related mitigation in the criminal trial,
encouraging a more careful and rigorous handling of such responsibility-related mitigation claims. As a result, the exiles would
receive at least some of the scrupulous attention provided to excuses. Diminishing the gap between excuse and responsibilityrelated mitigation would make exiling disfavored excuses less
problematic.
misleading evidence” and (ii) generic partial excuse might undermine crime-control (and
thus “threaten public safety”). Id. at 304–06.
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A further step is to reconsider the dismissive treatment of mitigations generally. As previously discussed, the traditional assumption
is that mitigation is less significant to criminal justice than excuse
and that mitigation is generally a marginal issue. Is this assumption
justified?
Because excuses are keyed to responsibility, they are relevant to
desert and, thus, to justice. Justice, of course, is a central value of
our criminal justice system. However, it is plausible that some mitigations are also keyed to responsibility and are, therefore, also
relevant to justice. If this is correct, excuse may not be categorically
more important than mitigation.
Moreover, even putting aside the ways in which some mitigations
bear on responsibility and justice, mitigation, of whatever sort, may
be more important than thus far recognized. Indeed, much of the
information that comes into criminal justice as mitigation seems
profoundly important to understanding offenses, offenders, the
reasons why offenders commit offenses, and the value derived from
inflicting punishment. It is normally only at the mitigation stage
that information about the long-term and formative causes of criminal behavior is introduced—the parental abuse, deprivation, role
models, peers, and community influences that set the stage for the
crime. While excuse doctrines sometimes open the door to evidence about profound mental illness, in most cases it is only at the
mitigation stage (if ever) that evidence of mental health problems,
intoxication, drug addiction, depression, or social impairment is
presented. Typically, it is only at this stage that the defendant can
point to desperate poverty, homelessness, hunger, experiences of
discrimination and prejudice, inability to find lawful means of subsistence, or futile searches for medical care.
All of these influences, conditions, and circumstances play a
profound role in criminal conduct. It seems strange, then, that this
information should play a less important role in the administration
of criminal justice than the information that the law recognizes
through the excuse doctrines. Whether or not the universe of mitigating information bears on individual justice, it is relevant on a
systemic level to the project of criminal justice: the causes of criminal behavior; the role that environment, culture, and circumstance
play; the levers to which crime control might most effectively attend; and the likely effect of punishment on the offender.
This highlights that while criminal justice has traditionally proceeded as though desert and justice were its most important
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considerations, it is not obviously true that they should be. Considering the purposes and effects of punishment might be equally
important.
Even if such a shift is not warranted, it might still be the case that
a great deal of the information the criminal justice system currently
relegates to the domain of mitigation, and thus to careless and
sloppy handling, is of great importance to the project of criminal
justice. That project might well benefit from paying this information better and closer attention. One way to accomplish this is to
reform the handling of mitigation so as to treat mitigation more
like excuse.

CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the boundary between excuse and mitigation, argued that some unwanted excuses are exiled to the realm
of mitigation, and suggested that contemporary practice marginalizes a wealth of information about criminals and crime by calling it
mitigation.
Offering a schema for excuse and mitigation that makes responsibility the crux of the distinction between them, this Article has
argued that current practice exiles some excusing facts to the domain of mitigation. It has highlighted some of the undesirable
consequences of doing so and suggested that the reasons for this
practice may not be entirely good ones. Furthermore, it has argued
that the realm of mitigation now serves as the unconscious of the
criminal law—a place where unwanted insights and the conflicts
they create are buried.
Finally, drawing further on the metaphor of unconscious conflict, this Article has suggested that it would be healthy to bring
these buried insights and conflicts fully into the consciousness of
the criminal law where they can be better appreciated, understood,
and addressed. One way to do so is to repatriate the exiled excuses
(through either wholesale revision or generic excuse doctrines).
Another is to reform the realm of mitigation—either narrowly (by
reforming the handling of responsibility-related mitigations) or
more profoundly (by reforming the handling of mitigations
generally).
On any of these approaches, responsibility-related considerations
currently classified as mitigations would be treated more carefully
and rigorously. Moreover, treating these considerations more carefully and rigorously would encourage more careful thinking about
these underappreciated responsibility-related considerations and
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their role in crime. This might, in turn, help make sense of some of
the criminal justice system’s perpetual pathologies, including its
failure to effectively control crime and its persistent and egregious
disparate impacts by race and class. It may be that some of the keys
to these perpetual pathologies lie in facts currently exiled to the
domain of mitigation. Moving them from mitigation to excuse—
from the criminal law’s unconscious to its consciousness—may
force us to grapple more deeply with them, help us see why these
perpetual problems have been so stubborn, and open the door to
more productive solutions.

